Interrogation First, Miranda Warnings Afterward: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court\u27s Approach to Delayed Miranda Warnings by Rodriguez, Joshua I.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 40
Number 3 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, Legitimacy and
Order: Analyzing Police-Citizen Interactions in the
Urban Landscape
Article 6
March 2016
Interrogation First, Miranda Warnings Afterward: A
Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court's Approach
to Delayed Miranda Warnings
Joshua I. Rodriguez
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joshua I. Rodriguez, Interrogation First, Miranda Warnings Afterward: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court's Approach to Delayed
Miranda Warnings, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1091 (2013).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol40/iss3/6
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013 8:39 PM 
 
1091 
INTERROGATION FIRST, MIRANDA 
WARNINGS AFTERWARD: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
APPROACH TO DELAYED MIRANDA 
WARNINGS 
Joshua I. Rodriguez* 
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1093 
  I.  Understanding the Origins of Question-First Jurisprudence .... 1097 
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda v. 
Arizona ................................................................................. 1097 
B. Oregon v. Elstad .................................................................. 1098 
C. Missouri v. Seibert ............................................................... 1100 
1. Description of Question-First Technique ................... 1100 
2. Seibert Question-First Analysis ................................... 1102 
  II.  Conflict Over the Proper Application of Missouri v. Seibert .. 1105 
A. Plurality v. Intent ................................................................. 1106 
1. Circuits that Apply the Plurality Approach to 
Evaluate Question-First Procedures ........................... 1106 
2. Circuits that Solely Apply Justice Kennedy’s 
Deliberateness Test to the Question-First 
Procedure Inquiry ......................................................... 1110 
3. Criticism and Justification of the Plurality 
Approach Versus Justice Kennedy’s Approach ........ 1111 
B. Three Circuit Court Approaches to Applying Justice 
Kennedy’s Concurrence ..................................................... 1113 
C. Criteria Used by Circuit Courts to Evaluate Justice 
Kennedy’s Factors and Other Considerations 
Associated with the Question-First Inquiry ..................... 1115 
1. Pre-Miranda Questioning and Statements ................. 1118 
2. Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-
Miranda Statements ...................................................... 1119 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2014.  I dedicate this Note to 
my mother, Elizabeth Amy Fein. 
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1092 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
3. Referencing Pre-Miranda statements in Post-
Miranda Interrogation .................................................. 1121 
4. Curative Measures ......................................................... 1121 
5. Burden of Proof ............................................................. 1122 
  III.  Resolution: A Question-First Analysis that Accurately 
Applies Missouri v. Seibert and the Policies and Precedent 
of Miranda ................................................................................... 1124 
A. In Support of an Intent-Based Approach ........................ 1125 
B. Courts Should Strictly Adhere to the Factors Set Forth 
by Justice Kennedy ............................................................. 1130 
C. Proper Application of Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
and Related Question—First Considerations .................. 1135 
1. Pre-Miranda Violation .................................................. 1135 
2. Completeness of Initial Pre-Miranda Warning and 
Statements ...................................................................... 1136 
3. Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-
Miranda Statements ...................................................... 1137 
4. Referencing Pre-Miranda Statements in Post-
Miranda Interrogation .................................................. 1139 
5. Curative Measures ......................................................... 1140 
6. Burden of Proof ............................................................. 1141 
7. Application of Holistic Question-First Approach ..... 1143 
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 1145 
 
 
The two-step interrogation tactic at issue in Missouri v. Seibert 
exemplifies gaming by observing a rule while undermining its 
purpose.1 
 
The Seibert opinions have sown confusion in federal and state 
courts, which have attempted to divine the governing standard that 
applies in successive interrogation cases involving warned and 
unwarned confessions.2 
 
 1. Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1439 (2011). 
 2. State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 453 (N.J. 2007). 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 6, 2010, Russell Hart was arrested in Nebraska on a 
parole violation originating in California.3  At the local jail, a police 
officer asked Hart what the underlying charge was with respect to the 
parole violation.4  Hart stated that he had failed to register as a sex 
offender in California.5  A deputy sheriff then asked Hart how long 
he had lived in Nebraska.6  When Hart responded that he had lived in 
Nebraska for approximately one month, another officer asked Hart if 
he had registered in Nebraska.7  Hart responded that he had not 
registered.8  At this point, the questioning, which had included no 
mention of Miranda warnings, paused while the police left to discuss 
Hart’s statement regarding his failure to register.9  Believing Hart had 
indicated an “Adam Walsh” violation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–
16991 by failing to register, the police quickly confirmed their 
suspicion with the Marshall’s Office in Lincoln, Nebraska, and 
returned to the interrogation room.10 
 
 3. United States v. Hart, No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1 (D. Neb. Nov. 
30, 2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  Hart had to register as a sex offender because he was convicted of rape in 
1975, which required the convict to register subsequently as a sex offender in the 
state where he resides. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); see also United States v. Hart, 
No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900 (D. Neb. Nov. 30, 2010), adopted by 4:10CR3088, 
2010 WL 5422638 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2010); Indictment 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), United 
States v. Hart, No. 8:10CR60 (D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2010), 2010 WL 6307345; Brief in 
Support of Motion for Variance from the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. 
Hart, No. 10CR03088 (D. Neb. Apr. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 7327472 [hereinafter Brief in 
Support of Motion for Variance].  After Hart’s parole, he was alternately either 
homeless or incarcerated and suffered from drug use, a bipolar condition, and 
depression. Brief in Support of Motion for Variance. Brief in Support of Motion for 
Variance, supra.  On July 10, 2010, Hart finished serving a prison term for a prior 
parole violation, and was released from prison. Id.  The following day, Hart boarded 
a bus and came to McCook, Nebraska, where three of his siblings were living. Id.  
The U.S. Marshal Service in Lincoln, Nebraska, was soon contacted by the U.S. 
Marshal Service in Fresno, California, and was told that Hart had an outstanding 
parole violation warrant for failing to register as a sex offender in California. Motion 
to Suppress Statements and Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument, 
United States v. Hart, No. 10CR03088 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2010), 2010 WL 6307346, at 
*1 .  Hart was subsequently arrested. Id. 
 6. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1094 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
Thirty minutes after questioning Hart about his failure to register 
in Nebraska, the same group of police officers resumed their 
interrogation.11  First, the police officers asked Hart if he would 
answer a few questions, which he agreed to do, and then presented 
Hart with a Miranda waiver, which he signed.12  Next, the police asked 
Hart how long he had lived in Nebraska and if he had registered as a 
sex offender in Nebraska.13  Hart repeated his earlier statement, 
stating he had lived in Nebraska for about a month and had not 
registered as a sex offender.14  The District Court denied Hart’s 
motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements, reasoning that the 
police did not use a question-first procedure calculated to elicit a 
post-Miranda confession from him.15 
The admissibility of post-Miranda statements in question-first cases 
is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Missouri v. Seibert.16  This Note considers the treatment of mid-
interrogation Miranda warning cases by the Federal Courts of 
Appeals in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s plurality 
opinion in Seibert17 and suggests how greater consistency, efficiency, 
and fidelity to the law might be achieved in future cases.  The Court 
described the question-first procedure as a “technique of withholding 
warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession,” 
which causes the subsequent Miranda “warnings [to] be ineffective in 
preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and 
similar in content.”18  When the warnings following an earlier 
unwarned statement are held ineffective, a statement or confession 
offered after that warning is inadmissible.19  In Seibert, the Court 
issued a plurality opinion to which four Justices joined.  Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence provided the deciding fifth vote.20  The five 
Justices disagreed, however, as to how effectiveness should be 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at *1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at *5–6. 
 16. 542 U.S. 600, 611–14 (2004). 
 17. Id. at 604–22. 
 18. Id. at 613. 
 19. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Under Seibert, every violation of 
Miranda does not require suppression of the evidence obtained. Id. at 618–19.  
Rather, “[e]vidence is admissible when the central concerns of Miranda are not likely 
to be implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are 
furthered by its introduction.” Id. at 618–19. 
 20. Id. at 618–21. 
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determined.21  In Seibert, the plurality uses a multifactor test to 
determine whether a suspect’s apprehension of the Miranda warning 
was rendered ineffective by the interrogator’s use of a question-first 
procedure.22  In contrast, Justice Kennedy articulates a “narrower 
test” that applies only to deliberate question-first procedures.23  
Further, while the Seibert plurality places the burden of showing 
admissibility on the prosecution,24 Justice Kennedy’s opinion is silent 
on the matter.25  Thus circuit courts in the wake of Seibert have 
disagreed as to whether the intent of the police responsible for the 
question-first procedure or the impact on the defendant of a police 
question-first procedure controls.26 
The conflict among circuit courts in question-first cases stems from 
various disagreements.  Circuits disagree as to whether the plurality 
or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides the narrowest grounds of 
the Supreme Court’s decision, and thus which opinion states the 
controlling rule.27  Moreover, the choice of factors determining 
whether the use of the mid-interrogation warning was “deliberate” in 
a particular case, in addition to their proper application, has been 
fraught with conflict.28  Lower courts also misconstrue the various 
policies underlying Miranda, such as dispelling the inherently 
coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations,29 deterring improper 
police conduct, and preserving the trustworthiness of confessions.30 
This Note seeks to clarify the complexity of Seibert and explain the 
failure of lower courts to accurately apply its precepts.  It goes on to 
suggest a solution to this problem that reflects the wisdom of Justice 
Kennedy’s view.   
Part I of this Note discusses the development of the Supreme 
Court’s question-first procedure jurisprudence, including a discussion 
 
 21. Id. at 622. 
 22. Id. at 611–14 (plurality opinion). 
 23. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 609 n.1 (plurality opinion) (The burden of showing admissibility rests, of 
course, on the prosecution” (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975))).  
The plurality in Seibert also places the burden of proving the effectiveness of the 
Miranda waiver at a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
 25. Id. at 618–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 
470, 478 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 n.11 (9th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See infra Parts Part II.B, II.C. 
 29. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 30. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308–09 (1985). 
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of question-first procedures generally; the development of the 
Miranda warning; the facts in Seibert that led to the Supreme Court’s 
focus on the question-first procedure; and the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of Miranda violations through question-first procedures. 
Part II analyzes ten circuit courts’ applications of Seibert in light of 
the considerations and analysis applied by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurrence, as well as the burden of proof required of the 
prosecution, if any, to show that police did not apply a deliberate two-
step interrogation technique.  Throughout this analysis, this Note 
examines the facts present in the circuit cases as they relate to those 
in Seibert. 
Lastly, Part III argues that Justice Kennedy’s approach, which is 
followed by the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, should be controlling.  Second, within the set of circuits 
following Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, this Note supports an 
approach followed only by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as 
particularly faithful to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, even though 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence does not explicitly advance any 
factors.31  Third, this Note seeks to clarify the proper application of 
the factors to be used by lower courts to comply with Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence.32  Finally, this Note attempts to bring order 
to the inconsistent and inefficient jurisprudence surrounding 
evaluations of potentially improper question-first procedures.33  In the 
aftermath of Seibert, circuit courts have used widely divergent and 
inconsistent criteria to evaluate whether a particular question-first 
procedure violates Miranda.  The criteria used by circuit courts often 
contradict the central concerns and considerations advanced by 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  Moreover, the inconsistency in the 
circuit courts’ treatment of question-first cases provides poor 
guidance to police and sows confusion in the lower courts.  This Note 
suggests a simple and more coherent standard in accordance with 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
 
 31. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004). 
 32. See id.  For example, circuit courts have also incorrectly approached the issues 
of whether a burden of proving a deliberate violation of Miranda should exist and 
whether the suspect or law enforcement must bear such a burden. See infra Part 
III.C.vi. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF QUESTION-FIRST 
JURISPRUDENCE 
To provide context to the standards applied by courts in question-
first cases, I provide a brief overview of the development of Supreme 
Court case law regarding custodial interrogations and Miranda 
warnings.  I then discuss the circumstances in Seibert, which led to the 
apparently deliberate two-step interrogation of the defendant.34 
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda v. 
Arizona 
Prior to Miranda, courts evaluated the admissibility of confessions 
under a voluntariness test, which the Supreme Court developed from 
the Fifth Amendment35 and the Fourteenth Amendment36 to the 
United States Constitution.37  In Haynes v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court held that a suspect’s custodial statements were involuntary 
where they had been obtained by “techniques and methods offensive 
to due process” or under circumstances precluding a suspect from 
exercising “a free and unconstrained will.”38  In 1966, however, the 
Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that statements made by a 
defendant while under custodial interrogation may not be used 
against him at trial, unless the prosecution proved that law 
enforcement took certain procedural steps to protect the defendant’s 
constitutional right against self-incrimination.39  Specifically, the 
Court in Miranda required law enforcement to advise custodial 
suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel 
before and during interrogation.40  In response, Congress attempted 
to overrule Miranda by passing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).41 
 
 34. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 37. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); see also Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227 (1940). 
 38. 373 U.S. at 514–15. 
 39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 40. Id. at 467–70. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 reads, in relevant part: 
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given. . . .  (b) The trial judge in determining the issue of 
voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding 
the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest 
and arraignment of the defendant . . . (2) whether such defendant knew the 
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Subsequently, in United States v. Dickerson, the Supreme Court 
examined 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Miranda opinion to determine 
whether the Miranda court had announced a constitutional rule.42  
The Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that 
replaced the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness 
test,43 and invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, reasoning that the statute 
must be invalid if Miranda continues to be the law.44  Given the 
Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda in Dickerson, the admissibility of 
statements made by a suspect during interrogation remains 
dependent upon the provision of Miranda warnings by police.45 
B. Oregon v. Elstad 
The Supreme Court first addressed the question-first procedure in 
Oregon v. Elstad.46  In Elstad, a police officer visited the home of an 
eighteen-year-old male suspect in a burglary.47  Without giving 
Miranda warnings, the officer asked whether the young man knew 
another man implicated in the robbery.48  After the suspect replied in 
the affirmative, the police officer informed the suspect that he 
believed the suspect was involved in the robbery, to which the suspect 
 
nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was 
suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such 
defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any 
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) 
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his 
right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was 
without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such 
confession. 
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken 
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of 
voluntariness of the confession. 
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000). 
 42. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437. 
 43. Id. at 438–43 (holding that Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility 
of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts). 
 44. Id. at 432 (finding Miranda to be a constitutional decision of the Court, which 
may not be overruled by an Act of Congress). 
 45. Id. at 444; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (finding that 
by adequately and effectively apprising a suspect that his rights and the exercise of 
those rights must be fully honored, Miranda “reduce[s] the risk of a coerced 
confession and [] implement[s] the Self–Incrimination Clause” (quoting Chavez v. 
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 47. Id. at 300–01. 
 48. Id. at 301. 
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again replied in the affirmative.49  The police subsequently drove the 
suspect to the police station, gave him a full set of warnings and 
elicited another confession, consistent with the first admission.50 
To determine whether the subsequent warned confession should be 
inadmissible at trial, the Elstad Court determined that “[t]he relevant 
inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily 
made.”51  Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the officer’s 
unwarned interrogation of the suspect was an oversight, and therefore 
“had none of the earmarks of coercion.”52  This directly contradicted 
the Oregon State Supreme Court’s position that, since the unwarned 
statement to the officer took place during a series of questions, the 
“cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on [the 
defendant’s] later admissions,” rendering them inadmissible.53  In 
response, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that 
“[a]bsent deliberate coercion or improper tactics in obtaining an 
unwarned statement, a careful and thorough administration of 
Miranda warnings cures the condition that rendered the unwarned 
statement inadmissible.”54  As a result, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Oregon State Supreme Court’s decision to suppress the suspect’s 
later warned confession, despite the fact that the suspect’s first 
admission was unwarned and the interrogation had proceeded in two 
steps, with an unwarned confession at the first step and a subsequent 
Mirandized confession at the second step. 
The difference between the determination of the Oregon Supreme 
Court and that of the United States Supreme Court in Elstad lies in 
the different perspective each side takes to evaluate whether the 
police conducted a deliberately coercive question-first procedure.  
While the Oregon court focuses on the coercive effect of the prior 
unwarned confession on later admissions, the Supreme Court 
disregards this consideration and instead focuses exclusively on 
whether the police officers’ execution of the unwarned and 
subsequent warned interrogations of a suspect were “deliberately 
coercive.”55 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 301–02. 
 51. Id. at 318. 
 52. Id. at 316 
 53. Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 54. Id. at 299. 
 55. Id. at 314 (“[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the 
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does 
not warrant a presumption of compulsion.”). 
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C. Missouri v. Seibert 
In Seibert, a defendant was suspected of involvement in the 
burning of a mobile home to conceal the circumstances of her son’s 
death in his sleep.56  Police arrested the defendant but failed to 
administer her Miranda warnings and questioned her for over half an 
hour, which resulted in the suspect’s confession that her son was 
actually supposed to die in the fire.57  Police then gave the defendant a 
twenty-minute break, returned to administer her Miranda warnings, 
and obtained a waiver.58 
The interrogating officer then resumed questioning the suspect, 
confronting her with her pre-Miranda statements and getting her to 
repeat the information she had revealed earlier.59  At trial, the officer 
testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda 
warnings, question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the 
question until he got the answer previously given, pursuant to an 
interrogation technique the officer was taught.60  Because the Court 
held that the Miranda warnings, which were given mid-interrogation 
after the defendant provided an unwarned confession, were 
ineffective, the suspect’s subsequent repeated confession was 
inadmissible at trial.61 
1. Description of Question-First Technique 
The Court described the question-first procedure as a police 
practice in custodial interrogations that calls for giving no warnings of 
the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has produced an 
incriminating statement.62  Though such a statement is generally 
inadmissible as it results from a violation of Miranda,63 the 
interrogating officer follows the statement with Miranda warnings 
and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time.64  
Because this question-first procedure does not effectively comply 
with Miranda’s constitutional requirement,65 the Supreme Court held 
 
 56. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004). 
 57. Id. at 604–05. 
 58. Id. at 605. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 605–06. 
 61. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
 63. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966). 
 64. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604. 
 65. See id. at 609. 
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that a statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is 
inadmissible.66  In Seibert, the Court stated that the technique of 
interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned phases raised a new 
challenge to Miranda.67  At the time of Seibert, the question-first 
procedure was widespread, having been included in police training 
nationwide.68  Though the question-first procedure’s prevalence in 
police training has decreased nationwide post-Seibert,69 police 
training advocacy of the procedure has not ceased entirely.70 
The question-first procedure undermines the effectiveness of the 
eventual Miranda warning because a suspect cannot understand 
initially that she has a right against self-incrimination once a she has 
already incriminated herself during the pre-Miranda stage.71  Further, 
it is unlikely that a suspect can retain the understanding that Miranda 
provides when the interrogator leads the suspect through her 
previous unprotected statements.72  Finally, it is unlikely that a 
suspect will understand that she has the right to stop the 
 
 66. Id. at 604; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda 
Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the 
Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1269 (2007). 
 67. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609. 
 68. Id. at 609–11; see also Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for A Lie: False Confessions 
and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 800 n.59 (2006). 
 69. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1553–54 
(2008). 
 70. Id.  This commentator provides evidence that formal training dissuading 
police from providing Miranda warnings has occurred since Seibert: 
     If the truth is that custodial interrogation without Miranda waivers does 
not violate the Constitution, does not violate the Miranda evidentiary rule, 
and does not constitute deterrable misconduct, any statements thus 
obtained have legitimate investigative and evidentiary uses: 
- Neutralize safety threats . . . 
- Locate weapons and evidence . . . 
- Identify witnesses . . . 
- Incriminate accomplices . . . 
- PC for search warrant . . . 
- PC for arrest . . . 
- Impeach inconsistent trial testimony . . . 
     Might knowledge of the truth about Miranda sometimes cause an 
interrogating officer to conclude that s/he might have something to gain 
through custodial interrogation without waivers? 
Id. (quoting L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SECRET PASSAGES, THE TRUTH 
ABOUT MIRANDA 10–12 (2005)). 
 71. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 n.5. 
 72. Id. 
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interrogation, since she has already provided unprotected 
incriminating statements.73 
2. Seibert Question-First Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s majority decision in Seibert to exclude the 
suspect’s confession was formed from a plurality, comprised of 
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,74 and a concurrence 
by Justice Kennedy.75  Rather than focus on the intent of the police 
officer that executed the question-first procedure, the plurality held 
“that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have 
understood them to convey a message that she retained a choice 
about continuing to talk.”76 
To decide whether the defendant’s warned confession in Seibert 
should be suppressed, the plurality in Seibert 
laid out five factors to be weighed when analyzing the effectiveness 
of the warning: (1) “the completeness and detail of the questions 
and answers in the first round of interrogation,” (2) “the 
overlapping content of the two statements,” (3) “the timing and 
setting of the first and second” interrogation, (4) “the continuity of 
police personnel,” and (5) “the degree to which the interrogator’s 
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”77 
Toward the end of the plurality’s opinion, the plurality applied this 
standard to the facts, which, it argued, collectively undermined the 
Miranda protection.  Significantly, the plurality equivocated with 
respect to whether this standard should be evaluated in terms of its 
police tactics or creating a coercive impact from the perspective of the 
suspect.78  First, the initial unwarned interrogation was described as 
“systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill,” 
leaving “little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.”79  
This satisfied the plurality’s first factor, which evaluated the 
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Justice Breyer joined in the plurality opinion fully, but also filed a concurring 
opinion. Id. at 617–18 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 617–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. (plurality opinion). 
 77. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Seibert, 542 
U.S. at 615). 
 78. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616–17. 
 79. Id. at 616. 
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round of interrogation.80  Second, because Seibert repeated her 
statements almost verbatim during both the unwarned and warned 
confessions, the content of the two statements clearly overlapped, 
thereby satisfying the second factor.81  Third, the plurality described 
the warned phase of questioning as proceeding after a pause of only 
fifteen to twenty minutes, in the same place as the unwarned 
segment.82  The short time between both interrogations and the fact 
that each of the interrogations took place in the station house fulfilled 
the timing and setting factor of the plurality approach.83 
Fourth, the same officer who had conducted the first phase recited 
the Miranda warnings, thereby continuing the police presence of the 
pre-Miranda questioning into the post-Miranda stage.  Fifth, the 
interrogating officers referenced the suspect’s pre-Miranda statement 
during the post-Miranda stage when she made a statement at odds 
with her unwarned confession.84  Additionally, the interrogating 
officer said nothing to counter the probable misimpression arising 
from the warning that anything Seibert said could be used against her, 
nor did the officer actually advise Seibert that her prior confession 
could not be used against her.85  This demonstrated the degree to 
which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first, satisfying the fifth factor.86  Lastly, the 
plurality did not undertake any curative measures analysis.87 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion differs in certain key respects 
from the plurality opinion.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy argues that 
statements obtained from police use of a question-first procedure 
should only be suppressed where the police conducted the question-
first procedure deliberately.  Justice Kennedy’s approach narrows the 
plurality’s approach in holding that the plurality’s test 
envisions an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect, 
and applies in the case of both intentional and unintentional two-
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 605 (noting police testimony stating “Trice, didn’t you tell me that he 
was supposed to die in his sleep?” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) (finding that interrogating officers did not use the 
suspect’s pre-Miranda statements to pressure the suspect into waiving the right to 
remain silent). 
 85. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616. 
 86. Id. at 616–17. 
 87. Id. 
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stage interrogations.  In my view, this test cuts too broadly. . . .  I 
would apply a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case, 
such as we have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique 
was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.88 
Additionally, according to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, if a 
court finds that the police executed a deliberate two-step 
interrogation, the court must also evaluate whether any curative 
measures took place afterwards to render the suspect’s confession 
admissible.89  These curative measures include allowing time to pass 
between interrogations, changing personnel, and changing location.  
The five-Justice majority held that post-Miranda statements, 
subsequent to a pre-Miranda interrogation, were inadmissible where 
mid-interrogation Miranda warnings were ineffective.90  Unlike 
Justice Kennedy, the plurality did not address curative measures as a 
separate step.  Additionally, the plurality was unclear as to whether 
effectiveness should be determined by the intent of the police 
responsible for the question-first procedure or the impact on the 
defendant of the question-first procedure.91 
Notably, Justice Kennedy shifts to addressing the impact on the 
defendant of the question-first procedure when evaluating curative 
measures, which he argues “should be designed to ensure that a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the 
import and effect of the Miranda warning and . . . waiver.”92  Indeed, a 
key difference between the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy lies 
in the focus of each.  In Seibert, the plurality resurrected the Oregon 
State Supreme Court’s focus in Elstad on an unwarned confession’s 
impact on a suspect to determine whether an improper question-first 
procedure occurred.93  This focus on the defendant, however, was too 
“broad” for Justice Kennedy, who was concerned that punishing 
unintentional failures to initially provide Miranda would fail to deter 
improper police conduct.94  Thus, in contrast to the four-Justice 
plurality’s approach, Justice Kennedy concluded that the statements 
 
 88. Id. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 622. 
 90. Id. at 616 (plurality opinion). 
 91. See generally id. at 600; see also infra Part III.A. 
 92. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 93. See id. at 617 (plurality opinion) (“These circumstances must be seen as 
challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point 
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood them to 
convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”). 
 94. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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repeated after later warnings would not be admissible if a deliberate 
question-first procedure was employed, where the administration of 
Miranda warnings occurred after a prior unwarned confession.95  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy held that upon use of a question-first 
procedure with the intention of violating Miranda during an extended 
interview, post-Miranda statements that are related to the substance 
of pre-Miranda statements must be excluded unless police take 
specific, curative steps to reestablish the effectiveness of the Miranda 
warning.96  In Seibert, Justice Kennedy found that the police executed 
a deliberate question-first procedure and failed to take curative 
measures to render the Miranda warning effective.97  As a result, the 
Court excluded the suspect’s post-Miranda statements. 
Part II will examine the approaches of circuit courts that seek to 
follow either the Seibert plurality or Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion and, among those circuits that follow Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, Part II will examine their approaches to the 
considerations that Justice Kennedy applied. 
II.  CONFLICT OVER THE PROPER APPLICATION OF MISSOURI V. 
SEIBERT 
The circuit courts have different approaches to evaluating whether 
police employed a question-first strategy.  Six circuits follow Justice 
Kennedy’s view and ask whether the violation was deliberate.  The 
remaining circuits either apply the plurality alone or use both tests 
concurrently, or combine parts of the two, and usually decline to 
decide which approach controls.98  In either case, the circuits usually 
decline to decide which approach controls.99   
This circuit split results in inconsistent suppression holdings in 
question-first cases, unpredictable law, and unclear guidance to law 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Justice Kennedy held in Seibert that if “deliberate, two-step strateg[ies], 
predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended interview” were used, the 
Court must determine whether “specific, curative steps” were taken to obviate the 
violation that occurred. Id. at 621. 
 97. Id. at 622. 
 98. Thompson v. Runnels, 657 F.3d 784, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Verdugo, 617 
F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d at 879, 885–86 (7th Cir. 
2009); United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008).  But see United 
States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 99. See United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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enforcement personnel.  This Part illustrates the circuit split by first 
examining the two-pronged approach of circuit courts that apply both 
the plurality approach and Justice Kennedy’s professedly narrower 
inquiry into whether the question-first procedure was deliberately 
executed by police, then by examining the more common approach of 
the circuit courts that follow Justice Kennedy’s narrower inquiry 
exclusively. 
The circuit courts also have three different approaches to applying 
Justice Kennedy’s inquiry into whether a question-first procedure was 
deliberately executed.100  Finally, this Part examines the circuits’ 
varying treatment of the considerations and criteria used by the lower 
courts to evaluate the deliberateness of question-first procedures.  
The approaches of the circuit courts that follow the plurality and 
those that follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence each have their 
strengths and weaknesses.101  Similarly, the approaches of the circuit 
courts to the factors comprising Justice Kennedy’s approach and 
other considerations involved in question-first cases also have 
strengths and weaknesses.102  Subsequently, Part II reviews praise and 
criticism of these approaches through the combined lenses of the 
policies underlying Miranda and the principle of stare decisis.103 
A. Plurality v. Intent 
1. Circuits that Apply the Plurality Approach to Evaluate 
Question-First Procedures 
Five circuits apply either solely the plurality approach or 
concurrently apply both the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s 
deliberateness test to question-first procedures.  Specifically, the First 
Circuit,104 Sixth Circuit,105 Seventh Circuit,106 Ninth Circuit,107 and 
 
 100. Differences arise in Justice Kennedy’s view when it is considered alone and 
when the plurality is also considered.  Although the plurality also varies somewhat in 
application across the circuits, these differences are less pronounced and are not 
examined here. 
 101. See infra Part II.A. 
 102. See infra Part II.B. 
 103. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619–20 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Oregon v. Elstad, 614 
U.S. 298, 308 (1995) (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)). 
 104. United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010) (declining to 
determine whether Seibert’s reach is limited to cases in which the police set out to 
subvert a suspect’s Miranda rights because the post-Miranda statement at issue was 
admissible even under the Seibert plurality’s more context-sensitive test); see also 
United States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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 105. United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (applied both 
Justice Kennedy’s test and the plurality’s test). But see United States v. Flack, No. 
3:08-CR-108, 2009 WL 5031320 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2009). 
 106. In the wake of Seibert, the Seventh Circuit has applied both a combination of 
the intent-focused approach and the plurality’s approach.  In United States v. Heron, 
the Seventh Circuit indicated that Seibert focused on the effectiveness of Miranda 
warnings, while applying both an “intent-based test” and a “defendant focused” test. 
564 F.3d 879, 885–86 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 
1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (indicating that “at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations 
in which Miranda warnings are intentionally withheld until after the suspect 
confesses, the central voluntariness inquiry . . . has been replaced by a presumptive 
rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, place, and 
circumstances from the first statement to the second,” and further indicating that 
Seibert might not control “[w]here the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a 
deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings”).  In cases that have been decided 
subsequent to Heron, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an intent-based approach to 
address two-step interrogations, which favors Elstad’s voluntariness inquiry over 
Seibert’s effectiveness inquiry. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; see also United States v. 
Hernandez, No. 11-CR-360, 2012 WL 601869, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012).  Note 
that an important rationale undergirding the Seventh Circuit’s approach to question-
first procedures is Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Seibert, which argues that Justice 
Kennedy’s focus is on intent. Specifically, Justice Breyer held that the intent of law 
enforcement to conduct a question-first procedure determined whether a suspect’s 
post-Miranda confession was voluntary, as opposed to whether the Miranda warning 
was effective. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
     Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit has appeared to adopt Justice Kennedy’s intent-
based inquiry in Seibert, but applied it to Elstad’s inquiry into whether a suspect’s 
post-Miranda confession was voluntary.  This Note, however, does not endorse this 
approach, as it does not deter improper police conduct because, like the plurality 
approach in Seibert, it is defendant-focused.  The Seventh Circuit’s approach is novel, 
given its efficient merging of Seibert into the effectiveness of Miranda and Elstad’s 
inquiry into the voluntariness of a suspect’s post-Miranda confession.  However, this 
Note does not favor this approach, as it does not deter improper police conduct, since 
like the plurality it is defendant-focused, and because it does not address which 
criteria should be used by courts to determine whether a question-first procedure was 
deliberate.  Though the Seventh Circuit steadfastly applied the plurality’s and Justice 
Kennedy’s tests, respectively, for over five years, in recent years, the Seventh Circuit 
has appeared to move towards the latter intent-based approach. See United States v. 
Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 
524–25 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995, 1004 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. 
Pettigrew, 455 F.3d 1164 (10th Circ. 2006).  The Seventh Circuit’s use of the intent-
based approach to determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s post-Miranda 
statements, however, is a significant change from Seibert’s inquiry into the 
effectiveness of the Miranda warning (subsequent to a prior pre-Miranda statement).  
For example, in United States v. Swanson, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated its use 
of the intent-based approach to determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession 
rather than the effectiveness of the Miranda warning. 635 F.3d at 1004.  In particular, 
the Court reasoned that the suspect’s initial statements were involuntary because 
police conducted a deliberate question-first procedure, and because subsequent 
curative measures, such as “the time that passes between confessions, the change in 
place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators[,]” did not 
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Tenth Circuit108 apply either the plurality or Justice Kennedy’s 
approach, or both, usually because both tests yield the same result.109  
To discern the correct Seibert holding, most circuit courts follow the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Marks, holding that 
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.110 
Some courts applying the Marks rule, however, disregard the focus 
on police intent in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence because seven 
other Justices rejected intent as grounds for determining whether an 
illegal question-first procedure has occurred.111 
 
insulate the suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda statements from the “taint” of the 
prior involuntary statement. Id. (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310, 314); see also Stewart, 
388 F.3d at 1089 (“[T]ruly ‘effective’ Miranda warnings . . . will occur only when 
certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a change in location or interrogating officer, 
or a shift in the focus of the questioning—intervene between the unwarned 
questioning and any postwarning statement.” (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 
(Breyer, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 107. Thompson v. Runnels, 657 F.3d 784, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
plurality and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence must be “read together”); cf. United 
States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[B]oth the plurality and 
Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a 
two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and 
circumstance and additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress 
the confession.  This narrower test—that excludes confessions made after a 
deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-stream warning—represents Seibert’s 
holding.”). 
 108. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58, 72 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the narrowest grounds for the 
Supreme Court’s decision to suppress). 
 109. United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to resolve the issue because the statement would be suppressed under any 
applicable framework); United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (holding there was no need to decide because statement is admissible 
under either test); see also Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 (D.C. 2007) 
(“[T]here is some disagreement concerning the precise analysis that Seibert mandates 
. . . [but] the statements in this case should have been suppressed under either 
standard.”). 
 110. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 111. See United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2009) (arguing that 
Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test in Seibert was not the narrowest approach “that 
Marks was talking about” because only Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer 
supported an intent-based test to evaluate question-first procedures”); United States 
v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1133–48 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is not narrower and therefore does not 
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Intra-circuit splits between whether to apply the plurality approach 
or Justice Kennedy’s approach have also plagued question-first 
jurisprudence.112  The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in United States 
v. Pacheco-Lopez that application of the plurality’s test was sufficient, 
stating that “[r]esolution of whether the police purposefully sought to 
evade Miranda is unnecessary, as Lopez’s statements are inadmissible 
even if the police didn’t purposefully implement a question first-warn 
later strategy.”113  In United States v. McConer, however, a question-
first decision filed only one day later, the Sixth Circuit held that 
“neither the plurality nor the concurrence in Seibert” demonstrated 
that police deliberately administered a question-first procedure to 
McConer.114  In arriving at its decision, the Court emphasized that 
“Justice Kennedy’s narrower concurrence . . . provided the fifth vote 
to find a Miranda violation in Seibert.”115   
Intra-state splits also exist.116  In United States v. Hairston, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals discussed both the plurality approach and Justice 
Kennedy’s approach, and attempted to determine whether the police 
had conducted a question-first procedure by applying the plurality’s 
test.117  In contrast, in Edwards v. United States, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals applied both approaches, reasoning that since “some 
disagreement concerning the precise analysis that Seibert mandates” 
and “the statements in this case should have been suppressed under 
 
represent the holding of the Court); see also Eric English, You Have the Right to 
Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v. Seibert and the 
Court’s Attempt to Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 
423, 462 (2006); cf. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x at 72 n.1 (collecting cases in 
support of the view that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence constituted the narrowest 
common ground of the Seibert majority). 
 112. See Heron, 564 F.3d at 885 (arguing that the Seibert plurality’s defendant-
focused approach is the correct method); cf. United States v. Hernandez, No. 11 CR 
360, 2012 WL 601869, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has 
adopted an intent-based approach to addressing two-step interrogations.” (citing 
United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Swanson, 635 F.3d 985, 1004 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943 
(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 113. See Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d at 432 n.10. 
 114. United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 498; see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 116. See Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (focusing 
exclusively on the five factor test applied by the Seibert plurality to determine 
whether the Miranda warnings were effective); cf. Edwards 923 A.2d at 848 (asking 
whether police deliberately used a question-first procedure). 
 117. Hairston, 905 A.2d at 781. 
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either standard, we need not determine the precise analysis that 
follows from the opinions in Seibert.”118 
Significantly, circuit cases have demonstrated that the choice 
between the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s approach can yield 
opposite results.119  Indeed, in United States v. Sanchez-Gallego, the 
Court contrasted the analysis present in the plurality approach with 
Justice Kennedy’s approach, and decided that “that the conclusion 
might be different under the plurality’s test in Seibert.”120  Further, in 
United States v. Zubiate, the Court found that the conduct of United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, who 
interrogated a suspect for fifteen minutes before providing the 
warnings, would not satisfy the plurality test but that the statement 
would satisfy Justice Kennedy’s because the conduct was not 
“calculated.”121  The cumulative effect of such divergent outcomes 
sows confusion both among police officer and the lower courts. 
2. Circuits that Solely Apply Justice Kennedy’s Deliberateness Test 
to the Question-First Procedure Inquiry 
Six circuits solely follow Justice Kennedy’s view and ask whether 
the question-first procedure was a deliberate violation of Miranda.  
Specifically, the Second Circuit,122 Third Circuit,123 Fourth Circuit,124 
Fifth Circuit,125 Eighth Circuit,126 and Eleventh Circuit127 conduct this 
 
 118. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 848. 
 119. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58, 73 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(Ebels, J., concurring); see also Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d at 426–30; United States v. 
Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151–53 (10th Cir. 2006); accord. People v. Lucas, 
232 P.3d 195 (Colo. App. 2009); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling 
(with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 48 (2010) (arguing 
that cases in which the police were not acting in bad faith—as the applying court 
understands the concept—yet the suspect was confused nonetheless about the 
freedom to stay mum after the Miranda warnings finally were delivered, the suspect 
will win under Justice Souter’s test and lose under Justice Kennedy’s test). 
 120. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x at 73 n.2. 
 121. No. 08-CR-507 (JG), 2009 WL 483199, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
 122. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 123. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 124. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 125. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5–4 decision, and decided the case on 
narrower grounds than the majority.”). 
 126. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United 
States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007)) (finding Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary for a 
majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality opinion).  
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inquiry.  Each of these circuits hold that Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence is controlling because it represents the narrowest 
grounds of the Seibert majority.  These circuits argue that the test 
stated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is the narrowest 
grounds because it applies the Supreme Court’s “effectiveness” 
inquiry only to deliberate execution of the question-first procedure.128 
3. Criticism and Justification of the Plurality Approach Versus 
Justice Kennedy’s Approach 
Policy considerations and adherence to stare decisis play a critical 
role in the criticism and justification of circuit courts’ decisions to use 
solely Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  A critic writes that Justice 
Kennedy’s approach cannot deter deliberate execution of the 
question-first procedure because judges forced to apply a subjective 
bad faith Miranda test will make disparate and arbitrary admissibility 
decisions.129  An alternate view counters that the plurality’s factors are 
no less vague.130  Moreover, one commentator argues that the intent 
of the officer is reliably ascertainable because it is a standard 
 
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Seibert, however, the Eighth 
Circuit applied only the plurality approach. See United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 
520 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 127. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert 
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest 
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 128. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010) (Trager, J. 
dissenting); see also United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a 
Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those 
cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s 
protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532–33 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying 
Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a 
deliberate two-step interrogation); Mashburn, 406 F.3d at 308–09 (“In Seibert, Justice 
Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court on the narrowest grounds.”); 
United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 2004) (arguing that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion was “of special significance” because he relied on grounds 
narrower than those of the plurality). 
 129. Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. 
Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 398–99 
(2005). 
 130. English, supra note 111, at 464–65; see also infra Part III (arguing that the 
multifactor test is supported by the plurality and Justice Kennedy and that the chief 
difference between the two lies in whether the inquiry focuses on the intent of the 
police or the suspect’s understanding of his right against self-incrimination). 
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inference in evidence that intent may be inferred from actions.131  
Additionally, in United States v. Capers, the Second Circuit justified 
the requirement that police prove that a question-first procedure was 
not deliberate by reasoning that Miranda is an exclusionary rule 
“aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution.”132  
Another view argues that only an intent-based approach is suited to 
evaluate an inherently coercive question-first tactic.133 
Addressing trustworthiness, a commentator observed that the post-
Miranda statements would be in danger of being compromised if 
subject to the potentially coercive pressures of a deliberate question-
first procedure.134  Another commentator argued that Justice 
Kennedy’s reasoning would apply to any confession, since deliberate 
execution of the question-first procedure can still yield trustworthy 
statements, and that is distinctly not what Miranda held.135  Justice 
O’Connor, in her dissenting opinion, similarly reasoned that a suspect 
who experienced the exact same interrogation as Seibert, but where 
the question-first procedure was not deliberate, would not have any 
corresponding change in the trustworthiness of his statements.136  
Justice O’Connor also argued that intent was impossible to discern.137  
Additionally, at least one critic has suggested that an intent-based 
approach will perversely incentivize covert execution of question-first 
procedures, which will be difficult to reveal.138  Another commentator, 
however, argued that it is a standard inference in evidence that courts 
may infer intent from actions.139 
Interpretation of the Seibert opinions is also crucial to determining 
which opinion is controlling.  Many courts justify choosing Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion as the narrowest ground of Seibert’s 
fragmented majority, because Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
holds that cases where a question-first procedure took place should 
be reviewed for the effectiveness of the Miranda warning only where 
 
 131. Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Breaching the Citadel: Willful Violations of 
Miranda After Missouri v. Seibert, 10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 91, 96–97 (2011). 
 132. Capers, 627 F.3d at 480. 
 133. See generally English, supra note 111, at 454–55. 
 134. Paul G. Alvarez, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Can Keep 
“Question-First” and “Outside Miranda” Interrogation Tactics in Check, 54 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1195, 1233 n.95 (2005). 
 135. Friedman, supra note 119, at 23. 
 136. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 623 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 626. 
 138. Fan, supra note 1, at 1437–38. 
 139. Sanders, supra note 131. 
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the interrogator deliberately used a two-step technique to circumvent 
Miranda.140  In contrast, other courts criticize this approach.  In 
United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, the Tenth Circuit argued that 
Justice Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected 
by a majority of the Seibert Court.141  In United States v. Rodriguez-
Preciado, a dissenting Ninth Circuit judge explained, “three of the 
four Justices in the plurality and the four dissenters decisively 
rejected any subjective [test] . . . based on deliberateness on the part 
of the police.”142  Moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals argued in 
Edwards that although Justice Kennedy’s test appears narrower 
because it only applies to the deliberate use of a two-step procedure, 
within that subset of cases, it is broader because Justice Kennedy’s 
approach would suppress even if a court determined that the Miranda 
warnings could function effectively.143  As a result, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals argues, more statements might be admitted that result from 
question-first procedures because the plurality’s approach only 
excludes confessions resulting from effective warnings, regardless of 
the intent of the interrogating officers, whereas Justice Kennedy’s 
approach reaches all intentional applications of the question-first 
procedure.144 
The following sections of Part II illustrate both the factors and 
considerations that the circuit courts use to determine whether 
instances of question-first interrogation by police were deliberate. 
B. Three Circuit Court Approaches to Applying Justice 
Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Circuit courts take three general approaches to evaluating whether 
police deliberately executed a question-first procedure.  In the first 
approach, circuits argue that Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness 
standard lacks explicit factors to consider because the record was 
clear in Seibert that the interrogating officers deliberately executed a 
 
 140. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010) (Trager, J., 
dissenting). 
 141. See United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 142. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1138–41 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Berzon, J., dissenting in part); see also United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 
(7th Cir. 2009) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence did not constitute the 
narrowest approach because seven of nine justices rejected an intent-based 
approach). 
 143. Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 n.10 (D.C. 2007). 
 144. Id. 
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question-first procedure.145  Circuits using this ad-hoc approach often 
cherry-pick factors from the plurality or underscore various facts or 
considerations to justify their evaluations of deliberateness.146 
In the second approach, courts use the factors stated by the 
plurality, regardless of whether the failure to administer Miranda 
warnings during the initial interrogation was deliberate or not, 
reasoning that “Justice Kennedy uses the same factors as the 
plurality’s approach, but he uses them . . . to determine whether 
police officers deliberately [withhold] Miranda warnings.”147  The 
application of these factors is still defendant-focused, however, in 
contrast to Justice Kennedy’s inquiry solely into the intent of the 
interrogating officers.148 
In the third approach, circuit courts adhere solely to the factors in 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, as opposed to strict adherence to the 
plurality’s factors or an ad hoc inquiry into the totality of the 
evidence.149  The third approach also focuses exclusively on the 
deliberateness of the police execution of the question-first procedure, 
as opposed to the second approach’s defendant-focused 
perspective.150  As an example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Eleventh 
Circuit examined whether pre-Miranda questioning by police elicited 
any incriminating statements, whether the officers did not have pre-
warned incriminating statements with which to cross-examine 
Gonzalez-Lauzan to pressure him to repeat them, and whether 
Gonzalez-Lauzan’s post-warning statements related to the substance 
of his single, brief pre-warning statement.151 
The circuit courts justify the three approaches to the Seibert factors 
with respect to the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
different ways.  For example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Tenth Circuit 
prefaced their approach of strict adherence to the factors applied by 
Justice Kennedy, simply by stating “the two-step technique employed 
 
 145. Capers, 627 F.3d at 477–78 (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 
1158 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006)) (finding that Justice Kennedy did not articulate how a 
court should determine whether an interrogator used a deliberate two-step strategy). 
 146. See infra Part III for criticism of this approach given its facilitation of biases 
for or against law enforcement. 
 147. United States v. Flack, No. 3:08-CR-108, 2009 WL 5031320, at *19–20 (E.D. 
Tenn. Dec. 11, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 148. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 618. 
 150. Id. at 620. 
 151. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138–39 (11th Cir. 2006); 
see also United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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here is of the type that was the narrow focus of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion.”152  At least one commentator supported this approach, 
suggesting that courts could hold that absence of one or more of the 
criteria cited by Justice Kennedy is indicative of willfulness.153 
In Capers, the Second Circuit examined the totality of the objective 
and subjective evidence by applying the five plurality factors and 
examining any other evidence available154 before inquiring into 
curative measures.  The court stated that all available evidence should 
be considered when examining whether the officers’ actions indicate a 
deliberate question-first procedure.  The court reasoned that both the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits used this approach, and noted Justice 
Souter’s observation that “‘the intent of the officer will rarely be as 
candidly admitted as it was’ in Seibert, where the interrogating officer 
testified . . . that he was trained to conduct a question-first 
procedure.”155  Finally, courts justify the ad hoc approach by stealth 
omission of any discussion of the use of the suspect’s pre-Miranda 
statements in the suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda interrogation.156 
C. Criteria Used by Circuit Courts to Evaluate Justice 
Kennedy’s Factors and Other Considerations Associated with the 
Question-First Inquiry 
The variance of the preceding circuit approaches results from the 
inherent difficulty of proving that police deliberately executed a 
question-first procedure.  Moreover, question-first cases usually fall 
into a grey area between a good-faith failure to administer an earlier 
Miranda warning and a deliberate execution of the question-first 
procedure.  Unlike Seibert, circuit courts rarely encounter question-
first cases in which police admit to deliberate execution of the 
question-first procedure. 
At least one circuit, however, has evaluated a failure to administer 
Miranda warnings that police admitted were deliberate.157  Such an 
 
 152. Gonzales-Lauzan, 437 F.3d at 1139. 
 153. Sanders, supra note 131, at 97. 
 154. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 155. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.  This quote from Seibert appears intended to imply 
that any possible evidence available to divine the intent of a police officer using a 
question-first procedure should be factored into a question-first analysis, given the 
rarity of the interrogating officer’s admission of deliberate use of question-first 
procedure. 
 156. See Capers, 627 F.3d at 470. 
 157. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2006) (officer 
testifying that “we had already discussed the robberies prior to me writing this, and I 
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admission is significant because the Supreme Court stated that it had 
to look at facts that demonstrated the question-first procedure, even 
though the interrogating officer in Seibert admitted intent to use the 
question-first procedure, “[b]ecause the intent of the officer will 
rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here (even as it is likely to 
determine the conduct of the interrogation).”158  Although both the 
Third and Eleventh Circuits have considered the admitted intent of 
police to forgo giving Miranda warnings in question-first cases,159 in 
addition to the requisite consideration of other factors, their 
treatment of police admissions of deliberateness contrasted starkly. 
In United States v. Green, the Third Circuit relied on police 
admissions of intent to withhold Miranda warnings as a sufficient 
basis for rendering a suspected drug dealer’s postwarning statements 
inadmissible.160  Given the testimony provided by the interrogation 
officer “that he intentionally refrained from advising Green of his 
Miranda rights prior to showing the video,”161 the Third Circuit held 
that “Seibert dictates that Green’s post-Miranda statements162 which 
relate to his pre-Miranda admissions are presumptively 
inadmissible.”163  In examining the police officer’s intent to evade 
Miranda, the court highlighted the police officer’s statement that he 
executed a “strategy” to “not Mirandize [the suspect] until he saw the 
video,”164 due in part to the officer’s prior knowledge of the suspect’s 
familiarity with Miranda.165  Additionally, in United States v. 
McBride, the District Court decided that the suspect’s post-Miranda 
statements were inadmissible because the police admitted to 
deliberate use of the question-first procedure.166  In Gonzalez-Lauzan, 
 
went back and while I was writing, I was also talking with him to get the further 
details”). 
 158. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614–17 n.6. 
 159. This case presents the uncommonly straightforward circumstance of an officer 
openly admitting that the violation was intentional.  But the inquiry will be 
complicated in other situations probably more likely to occur. Id. at 626 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
 160. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176, 191 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Seibert, 542 
U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The post-Miranda statements were a product of express questioning that 
immediately followed the pre-Miranda interrogation. Id. at 191. 
 163. Id. at 191. 
 164. Id. (citation omitted). 
 165. Id. at 185 n.8. 
 166. United States v. McBride, Crim. No. SA-06-CR-374, 2007 WL 102153, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2007) (finding that the interrogating officer admitted to 
“strategically decid[ing] before the interview not to provide any Miranda warnings so 
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however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the admitted intent of three 
officers to forgo providing Miranda warnings to a suspect did not 
require the exclusion of the suspect’s subsequent post-warning 
statements,167 despite a series of interrogations similar to those 
conducted by the Third Circuit in Green.168 
The circuit courts offer various justifications and criticisms in 
question-first cases involving police admission of a deliberate 
execution of the question-first procedure.  In Green, the interrogating 
officer openly stated at the suppression hearing that he intentionally 
refrained from advising the suspect of his Miranda rights prior to 
showing the video, and the court held that the suspect’s post-Miranda 
statements which relate to his pre-Miranda admissions were 
inadmissible unless the court determined that the second 
interrogation session was carried out under sufficiently different 
circumstances so as to have cured the initial taint.169  However, in a 
question-first case where, “[p]rior to the interrogation, the detectives 
had decided not to provide [the suspect] with Miranda warnings for 
fear that [the suspect] would again refuse to speak with them,”170 the 
United States Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion holding 
that “no two-step interrogation technique of the type that concerned 
the Court in Seibert undermined the Miranda warnings [the suspect] 
received.”171  Generally, however, courts begin their question-first 
inquiry with the pre-Miranda statement elicited by police use of the 
question-first procedure.172  This section therefore focuses on tests 
that circuit courts have developed to evaluate whether the factors 
they use are fulfilled. 
 
that he could gather background information to ‘determine [Defendant’s] level of 
truthfulness and degree of cooperation’”); see also United States v. Renken, 474 F.3d 
984, 988 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilkerson v. State, 424 A.3d 703, 719 (Md. 2011) (finding 
that courts should look to “the totality of the objective and subjective evidence” only 
if a police admission of deliberate use of the question-first procedure is absent 
(quoting United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 479 (2d Cir. 2010))); State v. Knapp, 
700 N.W.2d 899, 903–04 (Wis. 2005). 
 167. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1130 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the “three officers made a decision not to administer Miranda warnings 
to the suspect at the beginning of this meeting”). 
 168. 541 F.3d at 176. 
 169. Id. at 191 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 170. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 28 (2011). 
 171. Id. at 31. 
 172. The large quantity of decisions that focus on the necessity of Miranda in the 
pre-Miranda stage warrants their discussion, even though these situations may not 
technically fall under the ambit of Seibert. 
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1. Pre-Miranda Questioning and Statements 
Typically, courts first inquire into the length and completeness of 
the pre-Miranda questioning173 and statements.174  To undermine the 
Miranda warning, the initial interaction between a suspect and the 
police must constitute a custodial interrogation,175 which typically 
requires Miranda warnings to be administered before the 
interrogation may begin.176  Some courts, however, have found that 
police did not execute a question-first procedure because initial 
Miranda warnings were not required due to an exception to the 
Miranda requirement with respect to the circumstances surrounding 
the questioning.177  Other courts find initial Miranda warnings 
unnecessary due to the type of questioning during the pre-Miranda 
stage.178 
With respect to length of pre-Miranda questioning, some courts 
found it relevant to the pre-Miranda stage of the question-first 
inquiry whether pre-Miranda questioning was “short and cursory,”179 
or consisted of “one”180 or a similarly “limited number of 
 
 173. See United States v. Phillips, No. 08-96-GFVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111823, 
at *33–34 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 2008); see also United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 
575 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 174. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d 390, 407 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (quoting 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  See infra Part III for an 
evaluation of the term “extended interview.” 
 175. In Miranda, the Court held that statements made by a defendant while under 
custodial interrogation may not be used against him at trial, unless the prosecution 
proved that certain procedural safeguards were implemented to insure that the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was protected. Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  The Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. 
 176. United States v. Sanchez-Gallegos, 412 F. App’x 58 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that the suspect was not in custody when he was interrogated, thereby invalidating 
any subsequent Miranda violation). 
 177. See United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Thomas, 381 F. App’x. 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 
531 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th 
Cir. 2007); Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 786–87 (D.C. 2006) (Schwelb, J., 
concurring). 
 178. See United States v. Hernandez, No. 05-20158, 2012 WL 601869, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 23, 2012); United States v. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d 390, 403 (W.D. Tenn. 
2011) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)). 
 179. United States v. Phillips, No. 08-96-GFVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111823, at 
*33–34 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 2008). 
 180. United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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questions.”181  With respect to the length of pre-Miranda statements, 
courts also found it relevant to the question-first inquiry whether a 
brief statement could overlap significantly with a detailed post-
Miranda statement182 or needed to be systematic and exhaustive to 
constitute a deliberate question-first procedure.183 
Many courts have justified the failure to provide Miranda warnings 
during the initial stage of questioning as exceptions to the Miranda 
requirement.184  Other courts have voiced criticism of the use of 
exceptions.  In United States v. Woodruff, the court found that the 
interrogating officer should have known his question was reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response.185  In contrast, in United 
States v. Hernandez, the court asked whether it was “a foregone 
conclusion” that such a question would elicit information indicating 
criminal activity.186 
2. Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-Miranda 
Statements 
Circuit courts take slightly different approaches to the relationship 
between pre- and post-Miranda statements.  Some courts focus 
exclusively on how related pre- and post-Miranda statements are to 
each other.187  Other courts require that pre-Miranda and post-
Miranda statements overlap.188  This factor is significant because 
 
 181. United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 182. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 183. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 
616 (2004)).  See infra Part III for an evaluation of the meaning of the term 
“extended interview.” 
 184. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (finding that 
questioning required for police safety does not violate Miranda); United States v. 
Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that asking questions about 
when and how Lopez arrived at a household ostensibly linked to a drug sale, as well 
as his origin, are relevant to an investigation and cannot be described as related only 
to securing the house or identifying the defendant, and that administrative concerns, 
such as a defendant’s name, address, height, or weight, might permit questioning 
without a Miranda waiver). 
 185. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
301 (1980)). 
 186. United States v. Hernandez, No. 05-20158, 2012 WL 601869, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
 187. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 
525 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 188. Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 849 (D.C. 2007); Woodruff, 830 F. 
Supp. 2d at 407. 
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1120 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
“[r]eference to the prewarning statement [is] an implicit suggestion 
that the mere repetition of the earlier statement was not 
independently incriminating.”189 
Courts have justified their treatment of the relationship between 
pre-Miranda questioning and statements in two main ways: either the 
statements must overlap or the statements must be related.  For 
example, in United States v. Torres-Lona, the Eighth Circuit found 
no overlap where the post-Miranda statement was not identical to the 
pre-Miranda statement.190  Analogously, in Woodruff, the court found 
little overlap due to the different content of the two stages of 
questioning.191 
In contrast, in Edwards the D.C. Court of Appeals criticized the 
focus on overlap by courts.  Specifically, the court argued that 
different pre- and post-Miranda statements that addressed the same 
crime were indicative of a deliberate question-first procedure because 
“limiting Seibert to full confessions would encourage police to 
withhold Miranda warnings at the beginning of interrogations and 
bring the suspect to the brink of confessing.”192  The relationship 
between pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements influences how 
police may reference a pre-Miranda statement during a subsequent 
post-Miranda interrogation.193  For example, a police officer may 
learn new information that allows her to ask informed, open-ended 
questions. 
 
 189. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (2004). 
 190. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 191. Woodruff, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 192. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 850; see also Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1141 (finding that the 
appellant’s post-Miranda confession that he had received a gun in exchange for 
driving two people to a liquor store was related to his pre-Miranda admission that he 
had handled the gun); Mashburn, 406 F.3d at 309 (holding that when a “question-
first” strategy is deliberately employed, “postwarning statements related to the 
substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are 
taken before the postwarning statements are made”); United States v. Aguilar, 384 
F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004); cf. United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 523 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (finding that asking where a suspect had gotten the cocaine base found in 
his pocket was related to suspect’s subsequent post-Miranda statements because it 
addressed the same crime). 
 193. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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3. Referencing Pre-Miranda statements in Post-Miranda 
Interrogation 
Most courts evaluate whether post-Miranda questioning referenced 
pre-Miranda statements194 and ask whether the police confronted the 
suspect with her prior statements.195  The Eleventh Circuit, however, 
did not include this factor in its question-first analysis.196  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s omission is significant given the extent of 
treatment that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence devoted to it.197  Courts 
justify the reference to a pre-Miranda statement during a subsequent 
post-Miranda interrogation factor as part of their application of either 
the plurality approach or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  Courts 
justify omitting this factor by taking into account other factors, such 
as the experience of the officer.198 
4. Curative Measures 
Circuit courts treat curative measures similarly, though there are 
several slight variations.  Some circuit courts factor curative measures 
including continuity in interrogating officers and temporal and spatial 
proximity between interrogations into evaluating deliberateness.199  
For example, courts that apply the totality approach to evaluate 
 
 194. The Supreme Court refers to this factor as “[treatment of] the second round 
as continuous with the first.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615; see Hairston v. United States, 
905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (finding that the second phase was not “continuous 
with the first” in that in the first session the interrogating officer posed no questions 
to the suspect about the details of the murder, as he did in the second phase). 
 195. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
there is nothing to suggest that Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents 
improperly confronted the suspect with his prior false statement in an effort to have 
it repeated); United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that the suspect was not directly confronted with her prior statements, and 
that she was asked open-ended rather than leading questions); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1139 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he officers did not have 
prewarned incriminating statements with which to cross-examine [the suspect] in 
order to pressure him to repeat them and thereby undermine the Miranda 
warnings.”). 
 196. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (failing to ask 
whether the police relied upon the unwarned statements of the suspect in their 
second round of questioning despite the officer’s testimony that “we had already 
discussed the robberies prior to me writing this, and I went back and while I was 
writing, I was also talking with him to get the further details” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 197. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (finding that post-Miranda 
questioning that referenced pre-Miranda statements resembled a cross-examination). 
 198. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 199. Id. 
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whether a question-first procedure was deliberate incorporate those 
three considerations into their initial analysis.200  The Second Circuit 
justifies applying the curative factors to a deliberateness analysis and 
curing a finding of deliberateness because the curative factors 
illustrate evidence of a deliberate question-first procedure.201  Other 
courts ask whether these factors dissipated the impact of a prior 
deliberate question-first procedure.202  Some courts follow additional 
factors that Justice Kennedy suggests in his concurrence, including 
asking whether police advised the suspect that his prior pre-Miranda 
statements are inadmissible.203 
5. Burden of Proof 
Although Justice Kennedy’s four factors are the key to the 
substantive question of law, the procedural issue of burden of proof 
on this issue was not addressed by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and 
lower courts have properly treated that as an issue of first 
impression.204  Specifically, the issue of whether the suspect or law 
enforcement bears the burden of proof of deliberateness, and the 
level of that burden, has been debated by both commentators and 
circuit courts since Seibert was decided in 2004.205  Multiple circuit 
 
 200. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 201. Capers, 627 F.3d at 484. 
 202. Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 557 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no change in 
time, interrogating officer identity, or location). 
 203. The factors stated by Justice Kennedy, which also include the temporal, 
spatial, and personal continuity factors, are defendant-focused rather than intent-
focused. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. 
Capers, 627 F.3d at 485 n.6 (“When analyzing deliberateness, however, courts may 
consider an experienced officer’s failure to warn a suspect that an earlier admission, 
known to the interrogating officer, is inadmissible.  Indeed, such an omission on the 
part of the interrogating officer is probative of a ‘calculated’ plan to subvert 
Miranda.”); see also Coomer v. Yukins, 533 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
as reasonable the admission of subsequent statements elicited after several hours had 
passed since her first oral confession because police informed the defendant that 
“circumstances had changed [and] that she was now in custody”); Hairston v. United 
States, 905 A.2d 765, 781 (D.C. 2006) (finding close temporal proximity between 
phase one and phase two of police interrogations of the suspect, and that the sessions 
were conducted in the same interview room with the same interrogating officer in 
both stages). 
 204. Capers, 627 F.3d at 478 (citing Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158 n.11) (finding that 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is silent as to which party bears the burden of proving or 
disproving deliberateness). 
 205. See Daniel S. Nooter, Is Missouri v. Seibert Practicable?: Supreme Court 
Dances the “Two-Step” Around Miranda, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2005) 
(discussing burden of proof in question-first analysis generally). 
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courts merely “eyeball” the evidence with respect to a potential 
question-first tactic,206 while other circuits place the burden of proof 
on the defendant.207  Most circuits and commentators, however, 
believe that the prosecution should bear the burden of proof.208  
Additionally, among those courts in favor of requiring a burden of 
proof, at least three different standards of proof have been applied.209 
Courts and commentators have various justifications regarding 
their treatment of the burden of proof with respect to the deliberate 
question-first procedure.  In the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Court of 
Appeals, the courts argued that “placing that burden on the 
prosecution is consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions that 
require the government to prove the admissibility of a confession 
before it may come into evidence.”210  The Eighth Circuit has raised 
the criticism that “the law generally frowns on requiring a party to 
prove a negative.”211  One commentator, Daniel Nooter, disagrees 
with this view, however, arguing that “[j]ust as a criminal defendant 
does not affirmatively have the burden of disproving that an officer 
reasonably acted to uphold public safety, the defendant should not 
have the burden of disproving the exception Seibert recognizes for 
non-deliberate two-step interrogation.”212 
 
 206. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 207. United States v. Tolutau, No. 2:12-CR-22 CW, 2012 WL 1898879 (D. Utah 
May 23, 2012) (holding that the defendant has not met his burden of showing that law 
enforcement deliberately engaged in the interrogate-first technique proscribed in 
Seibert and is, therefore, not entitled to have his post-Miranda confession excluded 
from evidence at trial). 
 208. United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that it is 
the government’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the 
police did not deliberately withhold the warnings until after they had an initial 
inculpatory statement in hand”); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (“[W]here a defendant alleges that his post Miranda statement was 
obtained in the course of a two part interrogation, the prosecution bears the burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to provide 
warnings at the outset of interrogation was not deliberate.”); United States v. 
Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006) (“When a defendant challenges the 
voluntariness of a confession, the burden is on the government to show that a waiver 
of Miranda rights was the result of a defendant’s own free and rational choice in the 
totality of the circumstances.”); Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 848 (D.C. 
2007) (citing United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 209. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1113–15 (discussing burden of proof standards 
including proof by a preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing 
evidence). 
 210. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 848 (citing Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1142–43). 
 211. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143. 
 212. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1114.  This commentator also argues that to the 
extent a non-deliberate use of two-step interrogation forms an exception to the 
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Moreover, Nooter criticizes courts that merely “eyeball” question-
first procedures, reasoning that a “clear delineation of evidentiary 
burdens is required to ensure the consistent application of Seibert 
across jurisdictions.”213  Additionally, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Seibert criticizes courts that choose to eyeball the evidence, rather 
than assigning a burden of proof.214  In particular, Justice O’Connor 
argues, “there is no reason to believe that courts can with any degree 
of success determine in which instances the police had an ulterior 
motive.”215  Regarding the applicable standard of proof, a 
commentator argues that “[a] clear-and-convincing standard would 
not only prevent Seibert from being a dead-letter protection for 
defendants, but would provide the incentive for officers to read 
Miranda as soon as a suspect’s custodial status is clear.”216 
III.  RESOLUTION: A QUESTION-FIRST ANALYSIS THAT 
ACCURATELY APPLIES MISSOURI V. SEIBERT AND THE POLICIES 
AND PRECEDENT OF MIRANDA 
Part III proposes a three-part resolution to the problem of the 
circuit courts’ conflicting applications of the Seibert opinions.  First, 
this Part proposes the adoption of the test used by the Second 
Circuit,217 Third Circuit,218 Fourth Circuit,219 Fifth Circuit,220 Eighth 
Circuit,221 and Eleventh Circuit,222 rather than the other circuits’ use of 
 
plurality’s rule in Seibert, such an exception should resemble the “public safety” 
exception recognized in Quarles and analogized to by Justice Kennedy. Id. (citing 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 619 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 213. Id. at 1113. 
 214. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 627 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 626 (quoting W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996)) 
(emphasis added). 
 216. Nooter, supra note 205, at 1115. 
 217. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 218. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 219. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 220. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5-4 decision, and decided the case on 
narrower grounds than the majority.”). 
 221. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary 
for a majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality 
opinion). 
 222. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert 
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest 
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006))). 
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the plurality test or the wasteful dual application of both tests.223  
Next, this Part proposes the adoption of the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ strict adherence approach,224 which requires that courts 
adhere solely to the factors applied in Justice Kennedy’s analysis,225 as 
opposed to strict adherence to the plurality’s factors or an ad hoc 
inquiry into the totality of the evidence.226  Third, this Part proposes 
several clarifications to the factors used by the subset of circuit courts 
that use Justice Kennedy’s test.   
A. In Support of an Intent-Based Approach 
Justice Kennedy’s intent-based approach, followed by the Second 
Circuit,227 Third Circuit,228 Fourth Circuit,229 Fifth Circuit,230 Eighth 
Circuit,231 and Eleventh Circuit,232 should be followed for several 
reasons.  First, Justice Kennedy’s approach is justified by question-
first precedent established by the Supreme Court in Elstad.  In 
Elstad, the Court stated that 
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple 
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual 
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the 
suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is 
ineffective for some indeterminate period.233 
 
 223. See supra Part II.A. 
 224. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2006); Street, 472 
F.3d at 1313-14. 
 225. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 226. See United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 227. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 228. United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 229. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 230. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a 5-4 decision, and decided the case on 
narrower grounds than the majority.”). 
 231. United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence to be controlling because it provided the fifth vote necessary 
for a majority and because it was decided on narrower grounds than the plurality 
opinion). 
 232. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because Seibert 
is a plurality decision and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest 
grounds, it is his concurring opinion that provides the controlling law.” (citing United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1136. n.6 (11th Cir. 2006))). 
 233. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). 
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The term “calculated” modifies both “any actual coercion” and 
“other circumstances.”  The Supreme Court’s statement logically 
implies that a question-first procedure that, unlike Elstad, includes 
“actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the 
suspect’s ability to exercise his free will”234 will render a subsequent 
post-Miranda procedure ineffective.  Furthermore, in Elstad, the 
Supreme Court focused on the accidental nature of the police 
officer’s failure to provide initial Miranda warnings, reasoning that 
such question-first procedures were merely “technical” and 
unintentional violations of Miranda that did not require exclusion of 
post-Miranda statements.  Significantly, the Seibert plurality states 
that “it is fair to read Elstad as treating the living room conversation 
as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only open to correction by 
careful warnings before systematic questioning in that particular case, 
but posing no threat to warn-first practice generally.”235 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore is justified in its focus on 
deliberateness of the suspect’s post-Miranda statements because 
Elstad focuses on deliberateness to deny suppression of the post-
Miranda statements.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy expressly discusses the 
facts of Elstad and distinguishes them from the facts of Seibert, 
reasoning that the police officers in the latter case deliberately 
withheld Miranda warnings at the outset of the interrogation, only 
giving them after they had extracted a confession from the suspect, 
and then, during this second stage of the interrogation, referred back 
to statements made during the pre-Miranda interrogation. 
Courts should also follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence because it 
represents the narrowest grounds for the Seibert decision.  In Marks, 
the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.”236  Courts have defined one opinion as narrower 
when it “is a logical subset of other, broader opinions”237 and 
represents a “common denominator” of the judgment.238  The 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004). 
 236. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 237. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 238. Schindler v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 n.5 (7th Cir. 1983). 
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
2013] INTERROGATION FIRST 1127 
narrowest grounds analysis does not always apply, however.239  In 
particular, where the plurality and concurring opinions take distinct 
approaches and are mutually exclusive, no common denominator can 
represent the majority of a court decision.240  Accordingly, various 
courts have held that the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence are mutually exclusive.  For example, in Heron, the 
Seventh Circuit argued that intent could not constitute the narrowest 
grounds of the Seibert majority, based on the circuit court’s 
conclusion that seven of the Justices in Seibert had argued against 
focusing on intent.241 
The two opinions, however, are not mutually exclusive.  Justice 
Kennedy’s intent-based approach is used by both the plurality 
opinion and Justice Breyer’s concurrence.  Indeed, the plurality 
opinion supports the consideration of intent in multiple instances to 
evaluate whether post-Miranda statements should be suppressed in 
question-first cases.  First, the plurality describes Seibert’s facts as “by 
any objective measure reveal[ing] a police strategy adapted to 
undermine the Miranda warnings,”242 while describing the question-
first procedure in Elstad as “arguably innocent.”243  By focusing on 
the strategy of the police and the innocence of the interrogating 
officers, the plurality clearly considers intent in determining whether 
the post-Miranda warning was ineffective in the question-first 
procedure.  Moreover, the plurality interpreted Elstad as rejecting the 
“cat out of the bag” theory that unintentional, pre-Miranda warnings 
produced a psychological impact on the suspect that rendered 
Mirandized statements involuntary.244 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which comprises one of the Seibert 
majority’s five votes, provides evidence of the plurality’s support of 
an intent-based approach, while stating its own requirement for an 
intent-based approach.  Justice Breyer states, “I consequently join the 
plurality’s opinion in full.  I also agree with Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
insofar as it is consistent with this approach and makes clear that a 
 
 239. See generally Heather Bailey New, Determining the Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions in the Fifth Circuit, 20 APP. ADVOC. 112, 115 
(2007). 
 240. Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 241. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 242. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004). 
 243. Id. at 615. 
 244. Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985)). 
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good-faith exception applies.”245  Justice Breyer’s agreement with the 
plurality’s opinion in full, while still endorsing Justice Kennedy’s 
requirement that “good-faith” executions of the question-first 
procedure by police did not render the subsequent Miranda warning 
effective, shows that, on some level, the plurality examined intent.  
Thus, in addition to affirming the correctness of Justice Kennedy’s 
focus on intent, the Seibert plurality clearly considered police intent 
to be a focal point of the question-first inquiry. 
Justice Kennedy advocates a multifactor test like the plurality, but 
narrows its scope to deliberate, as opposed to unintentional, 
executions of the question-first procedure.  At least one critic246 of 
Justice Kennedy’s approach, however, argues that the plurality rejects 
any consideration of intent, and locates this rejection in a footnote 
that states the following: “Because the intent of the officer will rarely 
be as candidly admitted as it was here (even as it is likely to 
determine the conduct of the interrogation), the focus is on facts 
apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work.”247  The 
final clause of this sentence refers to the admitted intent of police 
officers as a fact.  Because the plurality lists admitted intent as a fact, 
among other facts that are used by the plurality to evaluate a 
potentially improper question-first procedure, this approach verifies 
looking to police intent as one ground for determining that a 
question-first procedure is improper.  In addition, the phrase “facts 
apart from intent” indicates that facts in addition to admitted intent 
must be sought, not that facts rather than intent must be focused 
upon.  Justice Kennedy’s narrower intent-based ground for 
suppression of post-Miranda statements is not distinct from the 
 
 245. Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy evidently agreed with this 
characterization of his intent-based approach, describing his approach as “a narrower 
test.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Critics have argued, however, that this 
characterization applies to the applicable factors rather than the focus of the test 
itself.  See infra Part III.B for an argument refuting this contention. 
 246. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and 
Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 678 n.196 (2006); James J. 
Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions 
Following a Deprivation of Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 736 n.172 
(2007); Stewart J. Weiss, Missouri v. Seibert: Two-Stepping Towards the Apocalypse, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 945, 975 (2005). 
 247. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6 (arguing that the Seibert plurality did not adopt 
the bad faith test because Justice Souter acknowledged in a footnote that police 
officers rarely admit to bad faith and therefore Miranda should focus “on facts apart 
from [police officer] intent”). 
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plurality’s grounds, and, therefore, represents the single controlling 
opinion of Seibert.248 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports the key policy underlying 
Miranda in its approach to the question-first procedure.  The primary 
purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect the Fifth Amendment 
rights of the criminal suspect from the inherently coercive 
atmosphere of custodial interrogations.  Relying on Elstad, both the 
three-Justice plurality and two concurring opinions in Seibert held 
that the interrogating officer’s question-first procedure violated the 
“general goal of deterring improper police conduct [and] the Fifth 
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence.”249  Both Seibert 
and Elstad also emphasized that the concerns underlying the Miranda 
rule must be accommodated to law enforcement interests,250 including 
the admissibility of reliable evidence, and other objectives of the 
criminal justice system.251   
Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness approach should be the sole 
precedent set by Seibert, because he correctly balances the concerns 
underlying custodial interrogations.252  Justice Kennedy begins his 
justification for his intent-based approach by stating, “An officer may 
not realize that a suspect is in custody and warnings are required.  
The officer may not plan to question the suspect or may be waiting 
for a more appropriate time.”253  Deterring unintentional actions is 
 
 248. Even if the plurality rejected using the multifactor test as an inquiry into the 
intent of police, which it does not, it nonetheless includes police intent as a rationale 
for holding that a suspect’s Miranda warning was not understood, thereby 
establishing a common denominator with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
 249. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619–20 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Elstad, 614 U.S. at 308 
(citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)).  According to Justice Kennedy, 
“[e]vidence is admissible when the central concerns of Miranda are not likely to be 
implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are best served by 
its introduction.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618–19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Note that 
Justice Kennedy, similarly to the plurality, employs curative measures to evaluate the 
ability of the suspect to understand his or her right against self-incrimination that 
Miranda is intended to protect. Id. at 619.  This conception of curative measures 
further establishes overlap between the two opinions. 
 250. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (finding that courts evaluating constitutional issues must 
undertake a balancing operation with the correct decision seen as the one yielding 
the greatest net benefit). 
 251. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644–45 (2004). 
 252. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he scope of the 
Miranda suppression remedy depends on a consideration of those legitimate interests 
and on whether admission of the evidence under the circumstances would frustrate 
Miranda’s central concerns and objectives.”). 
 253. Id. at 620. 
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unnecessary, unlike deterring intentional actions, which can prevent 
further reccurrences.  The argument regarding trustworthiness is 
slightly more complicated.  Given Justice Kennedy’s specific 
exclusion of unintentional two-step interrogations, the goal of 
assuring trustworthy evidence no longer seems to be the main focus.  
Indeed, confessions given by suspects who did not fully understand 
their Miranda warnings, due to unintentional failures to administer 
pre-Miranda warnings, may be prone to subsequent deception, such 
as post-Miranda questioning predicated upon pre-Miranda 
statements, and would therefore be less trustworthy.  Justice 
Kennedy’s approach, however, prevents this outcome and safeguards 
trustworthiness by focusing on post-Miranda cross-examining of a 
suspect predicated on their pre-Miranda statements as a key factor in 
evaluating deliberateness. 
Under the plurality’s approach, however, an unintentional 
question-first interrogation could render a post-Miranda statement 
inadmissible, even though improper police conduct was totally absent 
and the post-Miranda statements were unrelated to the prior pre-
Miranda statements and were unaddressed by police.  The focus of 
the plurality on the defendant has been incorrectly repeated by circuit 
courts that apply the plurality’s approach and Justice Kennedy’s 
approach alike.254  This mistake encourages courts to determine that 
the defendant was negatively affected and, as a result, suppress the 
defendant’s post-Miranda statement without considering the relevant 
factors and the policy underlying Elstad and Seibert. 
B. Courts Should Strictly Adhere to the Factors Set Forth by 
Justice Kennedy 
Courts should focus on four factors to adhere properly to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence.255  First, courts should focus upon whether a 
two-step interrogation was deliberate, as opposed to examining 
whether such an interrogation exerted a coercive impact on the 
 
 254. United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (Griffin, J., 
dissenting) (“We attempt to approximate what the defendant could understand only 
because we typically do not know what the defendant did understand.”); see also 
English, supra note 111, at 455 (arguing that a suspect-centric perspective fails to 
adequately condemn or limit the question-first tactic). 
 255. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  While Justice Kennedy, 
unlike the plurality, does not explicitly lay out a test to demonstrate how courts 
should arrive at the conclusion that a two-step interrogation was deliberate, his 
analysis still creates the functional equivalent of a test due to the specific factors he 
employs. See id. at 618–22. 
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suspect.256  Second, courts should examine whether the interrogating 
officers referenced the suspect’s unwarned confession in their 
subsequent warned interrogation.257  Third, the court should examine 
whether the suspect’s subsequent warned statements relied upon his 
or her prior unwarned statements.258  If these three considerations do 
indicate deliberateness, the courts should look to a fourth 
consideration: whether there were curative measures and whether the 
police cured the suspect of the coercive impact caused by the police’s 
deliberate interrogation strategy.259  Justice Kennedy applied this 
preceding consideration for a variety of reasons. 
First, the focus of Justice Kennedy’s inquiry is on facts relevant to 
the use by police of a deliberate question-first tactic by the police, as 
opposed to the impact on the suspect’s ability to understand his rights 
under Miranda.260  This factor is important because courts can justify 
admission of a coerced statement by incorrectly examining the effect 
of a failure to provide a suspect’s initial Miranda warnings on the 
subsequent Miranda warning and ignoring evidence indicating 
intentional use of a question-first procedure. 
Second, Justice Kennedy discusses the coercive effect of post-
Miranda questioning that is predicated on pre-Miranda statements 
elicited by police.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy discusses—for a full 
paragraph—the fact that the interrogating officer in Seibert 
confronted the defendant with her inadmissible prewarning 
statements and pushed her to acknowledge them.261  In Seibert, 
according to Kennedy’s concurrence, the interrogating officer cross-
examined the suspect based on his prior related or overlapping 
unwarned statements.262  Justice Kennedy’s focus on this issue 
 
 256. Id. at 622. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 621. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (“It is an unwarranted extension of 
Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by 
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s 
ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent 
voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.”). 
 261. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Note that a law 
enforcement officer may still deliberately predicate a line of questions upon a prior 
unwarned admission, which itself was not deliberately elicited, and, in doing so, 
employ a deliberate question-first procedure.  Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the 
issue of “cross-examin[ing]” a suspect with the contents of his unwarned confession 
supports this interpretation. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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illustrates that an interrogating officer’s reliance on the defendant’s 
prewarning statement to obtain the postwarning statement must be 
highly relevant to a finding that a deliberate two-step interrogation 
occurred.263 
Third, Justice Kennedy repeatedly states that postwarning 
statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements 
must be excluded if resulting from a deliberate two-step 
interrogation.264  The plurality, rather than Justice Kennedy, identifies 
the higher standard of overlap between the pre-Miranda and post-
Miranda statements as relevant to a question-first inquiry.265 Justice 
Kennedy’s lower threshold of relatedness is further demonstrated by 
the requirement in his final holding that suppressed post-Miranda 
statements be related to prior pre-Miranda statements.266 
Fourth, Justice Kennedy discusses curative measures.  According 
to Justice Kennedy, “a substantial break in time and circumstances 
between the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning may 
suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the accused to distinguish 
the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a 
new turn.”267  Alternatively, an additional warning that explains the 
likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be 
sufficient.268  The curative measures exception repeats the time and 
setting inquiry of the plurality multi-factor test, which, although 
utilizing a suspect-centric perspective,269 nevertheless comprises a 
mandatory consideration.270  No curative steps were taken in Seibert, 
however, so the postwarning statements are inadmissible and the 
 
 263. One may argue that a problem with this reasoning is that such reliance, and, 
thus, distortion of Miranda, can be equally accomplished through an unintentional 
question-first procedure (once an accidental unwarned statement occurs, it seems 
unfair and against the interests of Miranda for an interrogating officer to be able to 
refer back to this statement in order to get the suspect to repeat their earlier 
statement).  Suppressing statements originating from unintentional question-first 
procedures, however, cannot deter improper police conduct that is accidental. See id. 
at 620 (noting that an “officer may not realize that a suspect is in custody and 
warnings are required”). 
 264. Id. at 622. 
 265. Id. at 621. 
 266. Id. at 622 (finding that “postwarning statements that are related to the 
substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are 
taken before the postwarning statement is made,” where police have deliberately 
executed a question-first procedure). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 622; see United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 484 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 269. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 270. Id. 
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conviction was vacated.  Justice Kennedy determined that there were 
no curative measures taken by police, and that the initial questioning 
was intentional, unlike in Elstad, where the unwarned statement 
elicited by the officer was held to be inadvertent and police applied 
adequate curative measures.271  Lower courts that apply a Seibert 
analysis of question-first interrogation cases should adopt the four 
aforementioned factors. 
Adherence to Justice Kennedy’s factors, as opposed to strict 
adherence to the plurality’s factors or an ad hoc inquiry into the 
totality of the evidence, is correct for several reasons.  First, Justice 
Kennedy states that his multifactor test is limited to analyzing the 
intent of police in question-first cases, and excludes use of the 
multifactor test to illustrate unintentional question-first procedures.272  
Specifically, he favors a “narrower test” that would be inapplicable to 
unintentional question-first procedures and “applicable only in the 
infrequent case, such as we have here, in which the two-step 
interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine 
the Miranda warning.”273 
Further, Justice Kennedy separates curative measures from his 
deliberateness inquiry, while distinguishing those factors as 
defendant-focused, and not intent-focused.274  This distinction of 
curative factors is affirmed in Elstad, which held that “[w]hen a prior 
statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between 
confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in 
identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has 
carried over into the second confession.”275  Because these curative 
factors—temporal and geographic continuity, change in police 
personnel, and advisement that any pre-Miranda statements are 
inadmissible—are defendant-focused, they cannot use these factors in 
an inquiry limited to deliberateness.  Thus, the majority of circuit 
courts that incorrectly apply these factors to Justice Kennedy’s 
inquiry into deliberateness violate precedent.  Additionally, the 
process of applying the curative factors to both the deliberateness and 
curative inquiries is inefficient because it asks the same three 
questions twice.276   
 
 271. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
 272. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 622. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. 
 276. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Circuits that cherry-pick curative factors from the plurality test or 
elsewhere and insert them into the deliberateness inquiry do not 
follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  For example, in Capers, the 
Second Circuit uses the totality of the evidence approach, which 
considers types of evidence, such as the officer’s experience, which 
neither the plurality nor Justice Kennedy view as factors.277  The 
Second Circuit’s decision is questionable because it emphasizes 
factors that are not considered in Seibert, yet dismisses as a non-issue 
the most heavily emphasized factor in Justice Kennedy’s analysis—
reference to pre-Mirandized statements—by simply noting that the 
interrogating officer “made no reference . . . to the statements Capers 
had already made during the initial interrogation.”278   
Similarly, in Street, the Eleventh Circuit, using a cherry-picking 
approach, focuses on irrelevant considerations, and does not examine 
the clear relatedness of the pre- and post-Miranda statements or the 
interrogating officer’s referencing of the suspect’s prior statement.279  
Although there may be a slight lack of guidance regarding the relative 
weight of various factors,280 circuit courts violate stare decisis when 
they ignore the presence of factors expressly applied in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence.281  Furthermore, courts that use all of the 
plurality factors,282 or add additional factors not considered by the 
Seibert opinions,283 violate Marks because such considerations are not 
a logical subset of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 
The following analysis addresses the proper application of the 
factors articulated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence. 
 
 277. Id. at 480. 
 278. Id. at 473. 
 279. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 280. Seth Goldberg, Missouri v. Seibert: The Multifactor Test Should Be Replaced 
with A Bright-Line Warning Rule to Strengthen Miranda’s Clarity, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1287, 1309 (2005) (discussing the possibility that the factors from Seibert may 
carry different weight (citing Medley v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 411, 420, 426 
(Va. Ct. App. 2004) (Benton, J., dissenting))). 
 281. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618–22 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 282. Id. at 604–17 (plurality opinion). 
 283. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668-69 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 435 
F.3d 1148, 1158 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
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C. Proper Application of Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence and 
Related Question—First Considerations 
The factors that comprise Justice Kennedy’s test also require 
clarification on an individual basis, given their inconsistent 
application by lower courts.  As an initial matter, a police admission 
that the police intended to execute a question-first procedure should 
be sufficient to suppress any post-Miranda statements, subject to 
curative measures.  Such an admission is significant because the 
Supreme Court stated that it had to look at facts that demonstrated 
the question-first procedure, even though the interrogating officer in 
Seibert admitted intent to use the question-first procedure,284 only 
“[b]ecause the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted 
as it was here (even as it is likely to determine the conduct of the 
interrogation).”285  Indeed, it is inefficient to conduct a question-first 
inquiry into the intent of interrogating officers when police have 
given credible testimony that they deliberately executed a question-
first procedure.286 
1. Pre-Miranda Violation 
Many courts determine that a question-first procedure was 
deliberate by evaluating whether the first unwarned statement 
elicited by police violated Miranda, as opposed to falling within a 
booking, noncustodial, listening, safety, or other exception.287  
 
 284. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614–17. 
 285. Id. at 616 n.6. 
 286. But see Capers, 627 F.3d at 482 (“Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert 
does not advocate a test whereby a deliberate two-step interrogation will be found 
only when a law enforcement officer admits to executing such a strategy.”). 
 287. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (finding that 
questioning required for police safety does not violate Miranda); United States v. 
Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the interrogating officer asked 
questions to establish probable cause, not to circumvent Miranda warnings); United 
States v. Thomas, 381 F. App’x 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that “casual 
conversation” does not rise to the level of interrogation); United States v. Pacheco-
Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that “asking questions about 
when and how Lopez arrived at a household ostensibly linked to a drug sale, as well 
as his origin, are relevant to an investigation and cannot be described as related only 
to securing the house or identifying the defendant” and that administrative concerns, 
such as a defendant’s name, address, height, or weight, might permit questioning 
without a Miranda waiver); United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 
2007) (finding that illegal aliens are not entitled to Miranda warnings); Hairston v. 
United States, 905 A.2d 765, 786–87 (D.C. 2006) (Schweilb, J., concurring) (finding 
that presenting a suspect with incriminating evidence and instructing the suspect to 
listen does not violate Miranda). 
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Because application of Seibert’s inquiry hinges on an initial Miranda 
violation, courts must correctly determine when a pre-Miranda 
statement has been elicited by police in violation of Miranda.  When a 
failure to Mirandize an in-custody suspect does not fall under an 
exception to Miranda, any interrogation that is reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response violates Miranda.288 
2. Completeness of Initial Pre-Miranda Warning and Statements 
The completeness of the initial pre-Miranda warning and pre-
Miranda statements should be treated by courts as a relevant, though 
non-dispositive, factor.  While the plurality lists completeness as one 
of the first factors,289 Justice Kennedy appears to, at most, indirectly 
refer to the completeness of the pre-Miranda interrogation in his 
conclusion: “When an interrogator uses this deliberate, two-step 
strategy, predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended 
interview, post-Miranda statements that are related to the substance 
of pre-Miranda statements must be excluded absent specific, curative 
steps.”290  Justice Kennedy’s conclusion appears to include the term 
“extended interview,” possibly appearing to indicate that an extended 
interview was necessary for a court to find police use of a deliberate 
question-first procedure.  The term, however, is used in reference to 
the entire question-first procedure, because the extended interview 
includes the continuing violations of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment 
privileges during the second part of the interrogation, which takes 
place after the administration of the Miranda warning.  Unlike the 
plurality factors such as overlapping statements and continuing 
interrogations, Justice Kennedy does not use the plurality factor 
addressing completeness of pre-Miranda questioning and statements 
or move it to his curative measures analysis.  Thus, courts that rule 
out a deliberate question-first procedure, where a short round of 
questioning or a short statement by the suspect occurred, violate 
Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion. 
Unfortunately, several circuits still incorrectly apply this factor.  In 
Street, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated a potential question-first 
procedure, where a suspect was asked about his involvement in a 
robbery and gave several “incriminating statements,” although the 
 
 288. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (finding that words or actions 
that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response can constitute the 
functional equivalent of an interrogation). 
 289. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. 
 290. Id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
RODRIGUEZ_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
2013] INTERROGATION FIRST 1137 
“more damaging statements” were elicited following a Miranda 
warning.291  Due to the statements’ and interrogation’s brevity,292 the 
court held that police did not execute a deliberate question-first 
procedure.293  But in fact, an entire confession can be uttered in three 
words.  For example, in Gonzalez-Lauzan, the Eleventh Circuit 
argued that the suspect’s statement “made during the unwarned 
interrogation . . . , ‘okay, you got me,’” was too short and lacking 
detail to fulfill the plurality’s completeness factor (which the court 
should not have applied in the first place).294  In addition, the court 
supported its decision by improperly using dicta from the plurality 
opinion, stating, “there was little, if anything, of incriminating 
potential left unsaid,” which described the facts in Seibert, rather than 
a controlling standard.295 
The type of short but highly relevant information provided in pre-
Miranda statements in Street and Gonzalez-Lauzan can provide a 
foundation for police to ask informed related Mirandized questions, 
and circumvent the Miranda warning.  A complete initial round of 
questions and answers is less likely to be part of a deliberate question-
first procedure.  Police can use short questions and statements, 
however, as part of a question-first procedure.  As such, completeness 
of pre-Miranda questioning and statements should function as a 
relevant factor, but, in contrast to Street and Gonzalez-Lauzan, 
should not unilaterally determine whether police executed a question-
first procedure. 
3. Relationship Between Pre-Miranda and Post-Miranda 
Statements 
The relationship between pre-Miranda and post-Miranda 
statements also requires clarification.  The D.C. Court of Appeals and 
the Eighth Circuit use the correct approach regarding the relatedness 
of a suspect’s pre-Miranda statements to her post-Miranda 
statements.  Both courts reason that, at a minimum, a suspect’s pre-
Miranda and post-Miranda statements must relate “to the same 
 
 291. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1212 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 292. Id. at 1314. 
 293. Id. 
 294. United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616). 
 295. Id. (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616). 
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crime.”296  Instead of overlap, which, at best, follows the plurality and 
Justice Kennedy’s dicta, relatedness is rooted in Justice Kennedy’s 
principal holding.  Further, as the D.C. Court of Appeals stated in 
Edwards, focusing on relatedness, as opposed to overlap, prevents 
police from eliciting incriminating information until the confession is 
about to occur, and then administering Miranda warnings at the last 
moment.  Additionally, pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements 
need not be inculpatory.  Quoting the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Miranda, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that 
[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with 
our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, 
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a 
defendant.  No distinction can be drawn between statements which 
are direct confessions and statements which amount to “admissions” 
of part or all of an offense . . . .  Similarly, for precisely the same 
reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements 
and statements alleged to be merely “exculpatory.”  If a statement 
made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be 
used in the prosecution.297 
Exculpatory statements do not necessarily indicate the absence of a 
deliberate question-first procedure because police can deceptively 
bring the suspect to the brink of confessing, and then use the 
purportedly exculpatory pre-Miranda statements to minimize the step 
to the subsequent post-Miranda confession from the defendant’s 
perspective.298 
In contrast, the Second Department of the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of the State of New York held in People v. 
McMillon that police had not executed a deliberate question-first 
procedure because the suspect’s pre-Miranda statements were not 
incriminating.299  Indeed, the suspect had not provided inculpatory 
statements while subject to custodial interrogation for three hours 
before police provided him with Miranda warnings.300  The D.C. 
 
 296. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
appellant’s post-Miranda confession appellant’s post-Miranda confession that he had 
received a gun in exchange for driving two people to a liquor store was related to his 
pre-Miranda admission that he had handled the gun); Edwards v. United States, 923 
A.2d 840, 849 (D.C. 2007). 
 297. Edwards, 923 A.2d at 850 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 
(1966)). 
 298. See id. 
 299. People v. McMillon, 816 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 300. Id. at 170. 
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Court of Appeals’s acceptance of both exculpatory and inculpatory 
statements is superior, however, because it focuses on the pre-
Miranda statement’s effect on the Miranda warning, rather than 
whether the pre-Miranda statement is purportedly exculpatory, since 
it may still relate to the post-Miranda statements.301 
Police who learn from elicited pre-Miranda statements which 
questions they should ask during the post-Miranda stage can also 
game the overlap.302  Relatedness deters such conduct by including 
any post-Miranda statements that are related to the same crime 
referenced in the pre-Miranda stage.  Further, relatedness protects 
suspects from the inherently coercive custodial environment that 
diminishes the trustworthiness in the absence of the Miranda 
safeguard. 
4. Referencing Pre-Miranda Statements in Post-Miranda 
Interrogation 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence devotes a large portion to the police 
officers’ confrontation of the defendant with her inadmissible pre-
Miranda statements.303  This emphasis demonstrates the high level of 
importance of this factor in his question-first analysis.  Note that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is unclear as to whether a law 
enforcement officer has employed a deliberate two-step interrogation 
strategy where the officer deliberately predicated a line of questions 
upon a prior unwarned statement, which itself was not deliberately 
elicited.304  Justice Kennedy’s repeated emphasis on the fact that the 
police “cross-examined” the suspect in Seibert with the contents of 
her unwarned confession, and on the deterrence of improper police 
circumvention of Miranda, seems to support an interpretation that 
such a question-first procedure would still be deliberate. 
In addition, Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on referencing pre-
Miranda statements during post-Miranda interrogation is further 
justified by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Elstad.  Specifically, the 
Court observed in Elstad that the police officers did not “exploit the 
unwarned admission,”305 which contributed to their finding that the 
police officer did not execute a deliberate question-first procedure.306  
 
 301. Edwards, 923 A.2d, at 851–52. 
 302. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985). 
 306. Id. at 318. 
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The importance Justice Kennedy attributed to the police practice of 
predicating post-Miranda questioning on pre-Miranda statements 
calls into question circuit decisions such as Capers and Street, where 
courts found that police did not use a deliberate question-first 
procedure.307  Thus, the type of question-first procedure that falls 
within Justice Kennedy’s narrow concurrence addresses the police 
practice, where officers deliberately first obtained unwarned 
incriminating statements from a suspect, and then used those 
incriminating statements in the warned interrogation in order to 
undermine the midstream Miranda warnings. 
5. Curative Measures 
Courts’ application of the measures Justice Kennedy uses to cure a 
deliberate question-first procedure should adhere strictly to the 
factors advanced in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, and focus 
exclusively on the suspect’s impression of the mid-interrogation 
Miranda warning.  Courts’ inclusion of curative measures in Justice 
Kennedy’s deliberateness inquiry are incorrect because Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence follows Elstad’s use of the curative measures 
as intervening factors, the sole purpose of which is to dissipate the 
impact of a deliberate question-first procedure.308  Curative measures 
should include continuity in personnel, physical location, and breaks 
in time.309  Additionally, police advisement of the inadmissibility of a 
suspect’s prior pre-Miranda statements is a factor under Justice 
Kennedy’s curative measures exception.310  The Second Circuit, 
however, takes the unwarranted added step of including it in the 
deliberateness inquiry: 
Consideration of whether or not curative measures were taken is an 
inquiry separate and apart from determining deliberateness.  When 
analyzing deliberateness, however, courts may consider an 
experienced officer’s failure to warn a suspect that an earlier 
admission, known to the interrogating officer, is inadmissible.  
 
 307. See supra notes 277–83 and accompanying text. 
 308. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 341–42 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating that a suspect’s 
post-Miranda statements could not fairly be attributed to the statements taken in 
violation of Miranda if “a meaningful intervening event actually occurred”); Missouri 
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 309. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 310. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Kennedy’s advisement is 
grounded in Elstad, though the Elstad majority does not mention it. See Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 298 (majority opinion). 
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Indeed such an omission on the part of the interrogating officer is 
probative of a “calculated” plan to subvert Miranda.311 
The Second Circuit’s application of Justice Kennedy’s police 
advisement factor concerning the admissibility of the suspect’s prior 
pre-Miranda statement to the deliberateness inquiry is incorrect 
because Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the advisement factor is 
solely defendant-focused.312 
6. Burden of Proof 
After addressing Justice Kennedy’s factors directly, it is helpful to 
discuss the issue of burden of proof with respect to police use of the 
question-first procedure.  Traditionally, courts place the burden of 
proof on the prosecution in criminal cases.313  Moreover, “when a 
defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the burden is 
on the government to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was the 
result of a defendant’s own free and rational choice.”314  Courts 
should place a burden of proof on the prosecution to disprove 
deliberateness for a variety of reasons.315 
First, courts that merely “eyeball” whether post-Miranda 
statements resulting from a question-first procedure should be 
suppressed are prone to arbitrary decision making in the absence of a 
burden of proof.  In particular, Justice O’Connor, in her Seibert 
dissent, criticizes courts that choose to “eyeball” the evidence, rather 
than assign a burden of proof, arguing that “there is no reason to 
believe that courts can with any degree of success determine in which 
instances the police had an ulterior motive.”316  At least one circuit 
 
 311. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 485 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 312. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 313. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is “bottomed 
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free”). 
 314. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–65 (1986); United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 
452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 315. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 
1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 316. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting W. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996)) (emphasis added). 
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argues that the burden should be placed on the defendant.317  Second, 
the plurality states that the burden rests on the prosecution,318 and 
Justice Kennedy’s holding is the narrower ground and does not reject 
the plurality’s placement of the burden of proof on the prosecution. 
Additionally, at least one court has criticized any requirement that 
forces the prosecution to prove a negative.319  The Eighth Circuit, 
however, which also requires the prosecution to disprove 
deliberateness, cautioned that while “the law generally frowns on 
requiring a party to prove a negative,” the Supreme Court has 
consistently required the government to prove the admissibility of a 
criminal defendant’s confession.320  Thus, at the very least, when a 
defendant alleges that his post-Miranda statement was elicited by a 
deliberate question-first procedure, the prosecution bears the burden 
of establishing (at least) by a preponderance of the evidence321 that 
the failure to provide warnings at the outset of interrogation was not 
deliberate.322 
This burden of proof requirement will shape police conduct by 
disincentivizing question-first interrogations.  Specifically, the 
prosecution will be unable to prove beyond even a preponderance of 
the evidence that police did not deliberately execute a question-first 
procedure.  For example, in Capers, the Second Circuit held that 
[o]nce a law enforcement officer has detained a suspect and subjects 
him to interrogation . . . there is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason to 
delay giving a Miranda warning until after the suspect has confessed.  
 
 317. Moreno, supra note 129, at 397–98 (finding that Justice Kennedy’s intent-
based approach places an impossible and inappropriate burden on the defendant, 
who must now prove that a particular police officer acted in bad faith). 
 318. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608 n.1 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975)) (finding that the prosecution bears the burden of 
proving, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Miranda warning was 
effective). 
 319. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143. 
 320. Id. 
 321. United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]henever the 
State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the 
defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need 
prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. 
at 168) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 322. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007); Ollie, 442 F.3d 
at 1143; see also United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943, 955 (7th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (2008) (finding that it is the prosecution’s burden 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the police did not deliberately 
withhold the warnings until after they had an initial inculpatory statement in hand”). 
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Instead, the most plausible reason . . . is an illegitimate one, which is 
the interrogator’s desire to weaken the warning’s effectiveness.323 
Thus, the burden of proof can constrain police execution of the 
question-first by forcing the prosecution to show evidence that 
justifies the omission of Miranda warnings. 
7. Application of Holistic Question-First Approach 
Russell Hart’s case324 underscores how the circuit courts’ confusion 
can impact a suspect’s Fifth Amendment protection.325  When Hart’s 
case came before the District of Nebraska, the Eighth Circuit had 
correctly decided to treat Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as 
controlling.326  Three years earlier, however, the Eighth Circuit 
applied the factors from the Seibert plurality to determine the impact 
of an apparent question-first procedure on the post-Miranda 
confession.327 
In Hart, the trial court correctly followed Eighth Circuit precedent 
and Justice Kennedy’s intent-based approach.  The court, however, 
incorrectly treated the three factors regarding the temporal, spatial, 
and geographic proximity between pre- and post-Miranda 
interrogations as part of the inquiry into the initial effectiveness of 
the Miranda warning.328  
The court’s adherence to the factors applied by Justice Kennedy in 
Seibert also had serious shortcomings.  With respect to Hart’s pre-
Miranda statements, the court found that the interrogating officer’s 
inquiry into the length of time Hart had been in Nebraska and 
whether Hart had registered in Nebraska as a sex offender was 
reasonably likely to elicit information related to a violation of the 
“Adam Walsh” laws.329  This finding belies the court’s later reasoning 
 
 323. Capers, 627 F.3d at 480–81 (quoting United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 
1159 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 324. United States v. Hart, No. 4:10CR3088, 2010 WL 5422900 (D. Neb. Nov. 30, 
2010). 
 325. U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself.”). 
 326. United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 758–59 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 327. United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 523–25 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 328. Defendant Hart was questioned both times in the same booking room, at least 
one officer was present during both stages of questioning, and only thirty minutes 
passed between the two sessions of questioning. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *1. 
 329. Id. at *4 (“The law enforcement officers should have known that follow-up 
questions regarding Hart’s residency and registration status were directly related to a 
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that the question-first procedure was not deliberate because “[t]he 
initial questioning was the spontaneous result of the booking 
process,” rather than a “plan.”330  The court also raised the circular 
argument that the question-first procedure was legal because the 
police lacked any official question-first policy.  Given that Seibert 
provided a multifactor test because police “rarely” admit to executing 
question-first procedures,331 the presence of such a policy is 
unnecessary and unlikely.332 
The District Court’s most significant error arose in its 
determination of the relatedness of Hart’s pre-Miranda and post-
Miranda statements, and whether the interrogating officer relied on 
the defendant’s pre-Miranda statement to obtain the post-Miranda 
statement used against Hart.333  The relatedness of Hart’s pre- and 
post-Miranda statements, which is notably absent from the District 
Court’s analysis, is self-evident since both sets of Hart’s statements 
are identical.  Further, the District Court incorrectly concluded that 
the police did not refer to Hart’s pre-Miranda admissions while 
administering his Mirandized interrogation.334  Indeed, after initially 
eliciting the fact that Hart had yet to register as a sex offender beyond 
the acceptable time period, the police believed Hart had committed 
an Adam Walsh violation in Nebraska.  As a result, the police 
“contacted the Marshal’s office in Lincoln to gather information on 
the elements of the crime and an outline of questions to ask”335 before 
providing Hart with Miranda warnings and resuming the 
interrogation.  Thus, the police clearly relied upon the first statements 
in the subsequent stage, given that they arranged multiple questions 
based solely upon Hart’s previous pre-Miranda admissions.336  The 
District Court’s incorrect application of Seibert permitted the use of a 
 
potential violation of the Adam Walsh laws and could cause Hart to incriminate 
himself.”). 
 330. Id. at *6. 
 331. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004). 
 332. United States v. Stewart, 191 F. App’x 495, 499 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding it 
“unlikely that in the wake of Seibert and the cases interpreting it, that a law 
enforcement agency would maintain an official policy that invites suppression 
motions under Seibert”). 
 333. Hart, 2010 WL 5422900, at *6. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at *1. 
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question-first procedure that enables police to undermine the 
meaning and effect of Miranda.337 
CONCLUSION 
The resolution of the conflict between the circuit courts regarding 
the proper approach to evaluating question-first procedures is a 
desirable goal that would help achieve consistency in the lower courts 
and predictability for police officers conducting custodial 
interrogations.  The Supreme Court and dissenting circuit courts 
should adopt the intent-based approach of the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits because the approach adheres to 
the precedent set by Elstad, represents the narrowest grounds of 
Seibert, and furthers the policy underlying Miranda.  Furthermore, 
courts that conduct an inquiry into the deliberateness of a question-
first procedure should follow both the strict adherence approach of 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,338 and the foregoing clarifications of 
the various dimensions of question-first analysis.  Failure to do so 
risks violating stare decisis, the jurisprudence and policy underlying 
Miranda, and any hope of consistency in the examination of 
potentially deliberate question-first procedures. 
Criminal parole violator Russell Hart was deprived of his Miranda 
rights because the Nebraska police deliberately executed a question-
first procedure.  As a result, Hart was compelled to confess and his 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination were violated.  The 
lack of uniformity and clarity in the circuits with respect to question-
first cases and the multidimensional analysis involved in such cases 
likely contributed to this outcome.  A holistic resolution to the circuit 
court conflicts will, ideally, help reinforce Seibert and bring clarity to 
question-first law. 
 
 337. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 338. United States v. Hernandez, 200 F. App’x 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). 
